Covenants without the Sword? Comparing Prison Self-Governance Globally

Abstract

Why does prison social order vary around the world? While many of the basic characteristics of prisons are similar globally, the extent and form of informal inmate organization varies substantially. This paper develops a governance theory of prison social order. Inmates create extralegal governance institutions when official governance is insufficient. The size and demographics of the prison population explain why inmates produce extralegal governance institutions in either decentralized ways, such as ostracism, or through more centralized forms, such as gangs. Comparative analysis of Brazil,

Self-governing prisons: Prison gangs in an international perspective

“…Similar to prison behavior more generally, it has also been argued that both deprivation and importation theories are required to understand prison gangs (Crewe 2009;Cunha 2014;Mitchell et al 2017). Skarbek (2014Skarbek ( , 2016 questions the usefulness of the importation and deprivation models, stating that the empirical evidence for the importation theory is weak and that deprivation theory posits an invariant prison experience and prisoner identity that cannot explain variation in gang emergence. Instead, Skarbek (2014Skarbek ( , 2016 proposes that prison gangs emerge in prison populations in which decentralized mechanisms of governance, such as an inmate code, cannot be relied upon or when prison officials do not provide adequate governance.…”

“…Skarbek (2014Skarbek ( , 2016 questions the usefulness of the importation and deprivation models, stating that the empirical evidence for the importation theory is weak and that deprivation theory posits an invariant prison experience and prisoner identity that cannot explain variation in gang emergence. Instead, Skarbek (2014Skarbek ( , 2016 proposes that prison gangs emerge in prison populations in which decentralized mechanisms of governance, such as an inmate code, cannot be relied upon or when prison officials do not provide adequate governance. When attempting to explain the growth of US prison gangs, Skarbek (2011Skarbek ( , 2014Skarbek ( , 2016 finds that a rapidly growing US prison population, combined with increasing numbers of younger and drug using prisoners, led to a breakdown in the inmate code and a growing demand for governance among prisoners.…”

“…By using Skarbek's (2011Skarbek's ( , 2014 governance theory to examine the exportability of insights from the US to Kyrgyzstan, Northern Ireland and Brazil, this paper seeks to highlight how our theoretical understanding of the development, formation and structure of such groups can be enhanced by embracing a comparative perspective. The paper argues that while Skarbek's (2011Skarbek's ( , 2014Skarbek's ( , 2016 governance theory can offer useful insights into our understanding of when such groups emerge, deprivation and importation theories are important for explaining differences in the number of gangs and their ability to monopolise informal governance. By examining the wider socio-political context in varied jurisdictions, as well as the resourcing and penal architecture used, this paper demonstrates how deprivation and importation theories should be considered, alongside governance theories, to understand variation in the fragmentation of gangs and their consolidation.…”

Violência e negociação na construção da ordem nas prisões: a experiência paulista

“…Como as administrações prisionais lidam com a presença desses grupos, como se pactua a ordem entre essas esferas de poder, constituído e extralegal? Tais questões vêm estimulando diversos estudos como os de Sacha Darke (2013;2014), David Skarbek (2012;, Camila Dias e Fernando Salla (2013), dentre outros.…”

“…A prioridade do Comando no montante é pressionar o governador do estado a desativar aquele Campo de Concentração "anexo" à Casa de Custódia e Tratamento de Taubaté, de onde surgiu a semente e as raízes do Comando, no meio de tantas lutas inglórias e a tantos sofrimentos atrozes.O item 13 evidencia que um dos objetivos precípuos da organização do PCC foi, desde o início, promover segurança e autoproteção em face das condições carcerárias opressivas e do aumento da instabilidade, das pressões e da violência institucional, cujo marco foi o Massacre do Carandiru. Neste sentido, a governança e a provisão de proteção(Skarbek, 2012) são elementos essenciais para compreender a origem e o crescimento do PCC nas prisões de São Paulo, num contexto de recrudescimento da violência institucional, de aumento do encarceramento -portanto, da superlotação -e de degradação das condições carcerárias.…”