Court Reform, &lt;em&gt;Klērōtēria&lt;/em&gt;, and Comic Testimony

Carawan, Edwin

doi:10.5184/classicalj.111.4.0385

Cited by 5 publications

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“…As Kleros sees it, this technique offers a more efficient, and less corruptible system of juror deliberation due to its supposed resistance to juror bribery. While a proper critique of the historical accuracy of these claims is beyond the scope of this paper, some have argued that in practice the Klērōtēria was far more complex, and issues of juror corruption and bureaucratic centralization persisted alongside broader transformations in Athenian government (Carawan, 2016). For that matter, issues of juror corruption and bribery are generally not considered barriers to justice in contemporary scholarship (Macdonald, 2010).…”

Section: Disrupting Dispute Resolutionmentioning

confidence: 99%

From cryptocurrencies to cryptocourts: blockchain and the financialization of dispute resolution platforms

Dylag

Smith

2021

Information, Communication & Society

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This paper contributes to emerging discussions of blockchain governance through an analysis of dispute resolution platforms that reimagine justice. We focus specifically on Kleros, a blockchain-enabled dispute resolution platform, that promises to secure, authenticate, and democratize access to justice for the twenty-first century. We advance the concept of cryptocourts whereby jurors, incentivized by accumulating cryptocurrency, rapidly mobilize using principles of on-demand crowdsourcing to resolve disputes. We critique the broader social imaginaries that cryptocourts such as Kleros will result in a more open, trustworthy, transparent, and democratic systems of justice. These platforms instead pose important questions concerning their potential impact on civil dispute resolution practices by embedding it within an economy of cryptocurrency speculation. This ostensibly results in a legal infrastructure founded on principles of financial acquisition that positions jurors as economic agents seeking to profit from disputes, and courts as computational systems that merely authenticate and secure the distribution of evidence and verdicts.

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Section: Disrupting Dispute Resolutionmentioning

confidence: 99%