Cournot-Bertrand mixed oligopolies

Bylka, Stanisław; Komar, Jarosław

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-48296-0_3

Cited by 22 publications

(26 citation statements)

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“…Bylka and Komar () first developed the Cournot–Bertrand model, which synthesizes Cournot with Bertrand behavior. In their words (p. 23): “making a part of oligopolists behave in the Cournot manner – announcing supplies – and the other part in the Bertrand manner – announcing prices – we construct different mixed oligopolies.” That is, either

{scripts}_{1} = q_{1}

and

{scripts}_{2} = p_{2}

(Cournot–Bertrand) or

{scripts}_{1} = p_{1}

and

{scripts}_{2} = q_{2}

(Bertrand–Cournot).…”

Section: Early Development Of the Basic Cournot–bertrand Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…One reason for this lack of recognition is that scholars have not used a consistent name to identify the model. Important early studies by Bylka and Komar (), Singh and Vives (), and Sato () refer to it as a “mixed oligopoly” or a model with a “mixed equilibrium.” Correa‐Lopez () identifies it as a “mixed strategy setting.” These titles may lead to misunderstanding, as they are suggestive of a mixed‐strategy equilibrium where each firm chooses an action with a probability between 0 and 1. In addition, a mixed oligopoly has come to mean a model with a mixture of publicly owned and privately owned firms (De Fraja and Delbono, ; Shinozaki and Kunizaki, ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…One reason for this lack of recognition is that scholars have not used a consistent name to identify the model. Important early studies by Bylka and Komar (1976), Singh and Vives (1984), and Sato (1996) refer to it as a "mixed oligopoly" or a model with a "mixed equilibrium." Correa-Lopez (2007) identifies it as a "mixed strategy setting."…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Oligopoly Games and the Cournot–bertrand Model: A Survey

Tremblay

2019

Journal of Economic Surveys

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Traditional oligopoly models hold that firms compete in the same strategic variable, output (Cournot) or price (Bertrand). Alternatively, a hybrid model allows some firms to compete in output and other firms to compete in price, also known as the Cournot–Bertrand model. When the choice of strategic variable is endogenous, the established dominant strategy is output competition. A growing body of work demonstrates, however, that the Cournot–Bertrand outcome can be a subgame‐perfect Nash equilibrium in the presence of market asymmetries. Observations of real‐world markets consistent with Cournot–Bertrand behavior bolster justification for the model and have stimulated an impressive and evolving literature on advances and applications. We lay out the roots of the Cournot–Bertrand model and explore a number of model developments. We categorize 12 primary models in the literature based on alternative assumptions. In particular, some authors consider when the timing of play as well as the choice of strategic variable are endogenous. Altogether, this research identifies when Cournot–Bertrand behavior can emerge in a dynamic setting and under alternative market conditions. We also review the Cournot–Bertrand model applications in the fields of international economics, industrial organization, labor, and public economics. We expect the literature to continue to expand in the future.

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{scripts}_{1} = q_{1}

and

{scripts}_{2} = p_{2}

(Cournot–Bertrand) or

{scripts}_{1} = p_{1}

and

{scripts}_{2} = q_{2}

(Bertrand–Cournot).…”

Section: Early Development Of the Basic Cournot–bertrand Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Oligopoly Games and the Cournot–bertrand Model: A Survey

Tremblay

2019

Journal of Economic Surveys

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“…For instance, in competitive market, one enterprise competes in a dominant position and chooses output as decision variable while the other one is in disadvantage and chooses price as decision variable [18]. As far as we have known, Bylka et al and Singh et al were the first to analyse the mixed Cournot-Bertrand game [19,20]. Häckner, Zanchettin and Arya et al pointed that in some cases Cournot-Bertrand competition may be optimal [21][22][23].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Simulation on the Complementary Product Strategy Based on the Cournot-Bertrand Mixed Game Model

Huang¹,

Liu²,

Qi³

2014

Int. j. simul. model.

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In this article, we report the results of a study that explores an output-pricing game model in a complex system which comprises two main manufacturers and two complementary product enterprises. First, optimization method is used to study the influence of parameters on the optimal decisions of the model. Second, a dynamic game model and a controlled model are established in order to analyse the system's dynamic characteristics in disequilibrium state by dynamic simulation. The simulation results show that the increase of product substitutability will be unfavourable to all members of the complex system, enterprises should control the product's complementarity thus can they obtain maximum profit respectively. In addition, enterprises in the system can reach Nash Equilibrium, but complementary enterprises are lack of cooperation enthusiasm with the increase of substitutability of main product. The complex characteristics of the model with the change of parameters is exhibited by dynamic simulation, and the stability of variables will change when the parameters taking different values. The results can provide references for managers in variable adjustment, choice of complementary product strategy and product design, etc.

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“…The duopoly market model of Cournot (Case 1973, Bylka and Komar 1975, Sengupta 1978 a) which has been applied in several fields, ecology, for example, provides, in the static case, perhaps the simplest example of the role of information usage in reaching or converging towards an equilibrium solution.…”

Section: Information Processing In Cournot-type Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Game theory models applied to economic systems: their information, structure and stability

Sengupta

1982

International Journal of Systems Science

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A selective review and appraisal of current game-theoretic models applied to economic models of imperfect market systems is attempted here. Particular emphasis is placed on the analysis of various information structures available to the players, the stability characteristics of the equilibrium solutions if they exist and the various probability distributions involved in forecasting and searching for the opponents' strategies. IntroductionRecent applications of game theory models to economic systems have increasingly emphasized the role played by information in microeconomic models of imperfectly competitive markets. This required a more precise description of the demand and supply functions in the market and how signals or messages are processed and conveyed. In contrast to the deterministic models which emphasize a single unchanging price in a static framework, the recent models of markets with imperfect information (Rothschild 1973, Case 1973 have clarified the economic basis of uncertainty which complicates the formulation of the market models and their stability characteristics, e.g. firms have to decide upon the type of information to select, on the 'frequency of search and on the relative profitability and risk.In this paper we analyse the role of information, its prior availability and posterior usage in characterizing specific solutions of a class of non-cooperative games arising in many applied economic situations. An example is provided by the Cournot model, where there are two suppliers in a market, with demand parameters not completely known. Strategy in this case involves choosing output levels which are in some sense the best for each player. For instance, Cournot-Nash equilibrium solutions define such a class of strategies. Assume

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Cournot-Bertrand mixed oligopolies

Cited by 22 publications

References 1 publication

Oligopoly Games and the Cournot–bertrand Model: A Survey

Oligopoly Games and the Cournot–bertrand Model: A Survey

Simulation on the Complementary Product Strategy Based on the Cournot-Bertrand Mixed Game Model

Game theory models applied to economic systems: their information, structure and stability

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