Green production mode is an advanced manufacturing mode. However, due to the environmental externality of green production, it is different for a pure market mechanism to promote the evolution of green operation mode of manufacturing enterprises. Government regulation is very important. This paper establishes an evolutionary game model of whether manufacturing enterprises choose to implement green production mode when the government implements two different mechanisms of reward and punishment. Considering the complexity of strategy selection of enterprises' green production behaviour under market competition, the method constructs the simulation analysis model of enterprises' green product production behaviour with multi-subject participation. We can simulate the influence of these factors on the strategic choice of both parties (enterprises and governments) by changing the different influence factors, and studying the evolutionary law of different government guidance and regulation strategies on the production behaviour of green products. These factors include government incentives, penalties, reputations, costs, differences in the cost of implementing green production on the corporate side, corporate reputation, and false rewards or penalties. By the computer implementation of multi-subject modelling, the results show that enterprises' green product production behaviour needs the government's guidance and regulation. When formulating relevant policies, the government should combine various guidance and regulation strategies and fully consider the influence of market competition.
In this article, we report the results of a study that explores an output-pricing game model in a complex system which comprises two main manufacturers and two complementary product enterprises. First, optimization method is used to study the influence of parameters on the optimal decisions of the model. Second, a dynamic game model and a controlled model are established in order to analyse the system's dynamic characteristics in disequilibrium state by dynamic simulation. The simulation results show that the increase of product substitutability will be unfavourable to all members of the complex system, enterprises should control the product's complementarity thus can they obtain maximum profit respectively. In addition, enterprises in the system can reach Nash Equilibrium, but complementary enterprises are lack of cooperation enthusiasm with the increase of substitutability of main product. The complex characteristics of the model with the change of parameters is exhibited by dynamic simulation, and the stability of variables will change when the parameters taking different values. The results can provide references for managers in variable adjustment, choice of complementary product strategy and product design, etc.
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