Countering Violent Extremism and Radical Rhetoric

Abstract

How do extremist sympathizers respond to counter-radicalization efforts? Over the past decade, programs to counter violent extremism have mushroomed around the world, but little is known of their effectiveness. This study uses social media data to examine how counter-radicalization efforts shape engagement with extremist groups in the online world. Matching geolocated Twitter data on Islamic State sympathizers with granular information on counter-extremism activities in the United States, I find that, rather than deradicalizing, these efforts led Islamic State sympathizers to act strategically to avoid detection. After counter-extremism activities, the group's supporters on Twitter who were in the vicinity of these events began self-censoring expressions of support for the Islamic State, altered profile images and screen names, and encouraged followers to migrate to Telegram, an encrypted network not viewable by the public. These findings reveal previously unknown patterns in the effects of counter-extremism programs in the digital era.

Offline events and online hate

“…Despite efforts by mainstream platforms to remove hate speech, it has grown in volume on fringe platforms such as 4Chan and Telegram (see Figs 8 and 10 in S1 File ). Online extremists are known to migrate to less-moderated platforms after being removed from mainstream platforms [ 38 , 44 ], which may be less susceptible to public and policymaker pressure.…”

“…Yet we find that, on the platforms we studied, including those that are moderated, hate speech increased despite elevated efforts to curtail it by moderated platforms, particularly during the second half of 2020. Although some platforms are increasingly committed to removing hate speech and other malicious content, hate content persists on such platforms (see, for example, Online extremists are known to migrate to less-moderated platforms after being removed from mainstream platforms [38,44], which may be less susceptible to public and policymaker pressure.…”

The Perils of Estimating Disengagement Effects of Deadly Terrorist Attacks Utilizing Social Media Data

“…Social media account closurewhether voluntary closure or forced suspensionis a widely discussed phenomenon in the debate and literature on terrorist presence on social media platforms (Berger and Perez 2016;Conway et al 2019;Huey 2015;Klausen, Marks and Zaman 2018;Mitts 2020;Nouri, Lorenzo-Dus and Watkin 2019;Pearson 2018;Shehabat and Mitew 2018;Weimann 2019;Wright et al 2016). To combat the spread of terrorist content, many social media platforms have engaged heavily in efforts to close accounts with terrorist affiliations (Abutaleb 2016;Alba, Edmondson and Isaac 2019; 'An Update on Our Efforts to Combat Violent Extremism' 2016), especially after the surge of IS on Twitter during the early 2010s (Pearson 2018;Shehabat and Mitew 2018).…”

“…By quoting FBI Director James Comey, the authors themselves point out the tendency for recruits to be 'move [d] […] to an encrypted mobile-messaging app so they go dark to us' (Barceló and Labzina 2020, 1,543). Within the field of terrorism studies, several scholars have discussed this tendency, showing how terrorist online activity in the mid-2010s partially moved to other, more secure platforms like the encrypted platform Telegram and the anonymous file-sharing site Justpaste.it following the surge in suspensions on mainstream platforms (Berger and Perez 2016;Bloom, Tiflati, and Horgan 2019;Mitts 2020;Nouri, Lorenzo-Dus, and Watkin 2019;Shehabat and Mitew 2018). If IS recruiters time such moves based on the present security environment, which should be especially hostile directly following deadly terrorist attacks, large-scale account closures and inactivityreflecting moves to more secure platformsmay co-occur with deadly terrorist attacks.…”

Will failed insurrection lead to terrorism in the United States?

“…In addition, recent research into jihadist group internet behavior has shown that extremist groups are well aware of the risks of communicating through open access social media channels (Mitts, 2021). For example, ISIS sympathizers on Twitter responded to government efforts to prevent extremism through public community engagement activities by moving to encrypted channels such as Telegram in order to avoid detection.…”