Counterfactual reasoning and knowledge of possibilities

Gregory, Dominic

doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0707-2

“…In different ways, Lowe (2012), Deng (2016), Gregory (2017), andThomasson (2018) all have called into question the capacity of Williamson's account to elucidate knowledge of metaphysical modality. Gregory contends that it is not clear that the same sorts of considerations effectively bear upon mundane counterfactual judgments as well as metaphysical modal judgments.…”

Section: Causal-nomological Necessity and Metaphysical Necessitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Superexplanations for counterfactual knowledge

Mallozzi

¹

2020

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I discuss several problems for Williamson's counterfactual-theory of modal knowledge and argue that they have a common source, in that the theory neglects to elucidate the proper constraints on modal reasoning. Williamson puts forward an empirical hypothesis that rests on the role of counterfactual reasoning for modal knowledge. But he overlooks central questions of normative modal epistemology. In order for counterfactual reasoning to yield correct beliefs about modality, it needs to be suitably constrained. I argue that what is needed is, specifically, information concerning the nature or essence of things. By integrating this information, essentialist deduction arguably provides a better account of our knowledge of modality. Furthermore, I argue that essences have distinctive causal and explanatory powers-indeed, essences are superexplanatory for how things are. Compared to Williamson's counterfactual-theory, superexplanatory essentialism clarifies what the proper constraints on modal reasoning are, and why they have such a special status.

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“…[W]e may well be more reliable in evaluating counterfactuals whose antecedents involve small departures from the actual world than in evaluating those whose antecedents involve much larger departures. We may be correspondingly more reliable in evaluating the possibility of See Casullo (2012), Gregory (2017), Jenkins (2008), Mallozzi (2021), Roca-Royes (2011), and Tahko (2012). 17…”

Section: Imaginationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Grounding interventionism: Conceptual and epistemological challenges

Bryant¹

2023

Examining Philosophy Itself

0

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Philosophers have recently highlighted substantial affinities between causation and grounding, which has inclined some to import the conceptual and formal resources of causal interventionism into the metaphysics of grounding. The prospect of grounding interventionism raises two important questions: exactly what are grounding interventions, and why should we think they enable knowledge of grounding? This paper will approach these questions by examining how causal interventionists have addressed (or might address) analogous questions and then comparing the available options for grounding interventionism. I argue that grounding interventions must be understood in worldly terms, as adding something to or deleting something from the roster of entities, or making some fact obtain or fail to obtain. I consider three bases for counterfactual assessment: imagination, structural equation models, and background theory. I conclude that grounding interventionism requires firmer epistemological foundations, without which the interventionist's epistemology of grounding is incomplete and ineffectually rationalist.

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“…[W]e may well be more reliable in evaluating counterfactuals whose antecedents involve small departures from the actual world than in evaluating those whose antecedents involve much larger departures. We may be correspondingly more reliable in evaluating the possibility of See Casullo (2012), Gregory (2017), Jenkins (2008), Mallozzi (2021), Roca-Royes (2011), and Tahko (2012). 17…”

Section: Imaginationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… See Casullo 2012;Gregory 2017;Jenkins 2008;Mallozzi 2021;Roca-Royes 2011; and Tahko 2012. 18 On the role of imagination in thought experiments, see alsoArcangeli 2010and Meynell 2014 …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Grounding interventionism: Conceptual and epistemological challenges

Bryant

¹

2022

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Philosophers have recently highlighted substantial affinities between causation and grounding, which has inclined some to import the conceptual and formal resources of causal interventionism into the metaphysics of grounding. The prospect of grounding interventionism raises two important questions: exactly what are grounding interventions, and why should we think they enable knowledge of grounding? This paper will approach these questions by examining how causal interventionists have addressed (or might address) analogous questions and then comparing the available options for grounding interventionism. I argue that grounding interventions must be understood in worldly terms, as adding something to or deleting something from the roster of entities, or making some fact obtain or fail to obtain. I consider three bases for counterfactual assessment: imagination, structural equation models, and background theory. I conclude that grounding interventionism requires firmer epistemological foundations, without which the interventionist's epistemology of grounding is incomplete and ineffectually rationalist.

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Counterfactual reasoning and knowledge of possibilities

Cited by 8 publications

References 7 publications

Superexplanations for counterfactual knowledge

Superexplanations for counterfactual knowledge

Grounding interventionism: Conceptual and epistemological challenges

Grounding interventionism: Conceptual and epistemological challenges

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