Grounding interventionism: Conceptual and epistemological challenges

Abstract

Philosophers have recently highlighted substantial affinities between causation and grounding, which has inclined some to import the conceptual and formal resources of causal interventionism into the metaphysics of grounding. The prospect of grounding interventionism raises two important questions: exactly what are grounding interventions, and why should we think they enable knowledge of grounding? This paper will approach these questions by examining how causal interventionists have addressed (or might address) analogous questions and then comparing the available options for grounding interventionism. I argue that grounding interventions must be understood in worldly terms, as adding something to or deleting something from the roster of entities, or making some fact obtain or fail to obtain. I consider three bases for counterfactual assessment: imagination, structural equation models, and background theory. I conclude that grounding interventionism requires firmer epistemological foundations, without which the interventionist's epistemology of grounding is incomplete and ineffectually rationalist.

Scientific explanation as a guide to ground

“…For example, Koslicki (2016) and Jansson (2018) have argued that the applicability of structural equations to grounding faces severe limitations. And Bryant (2022) has objected that the epistemic credentials of grounding interventionism are lower than those of its causal counterpart.…”