2022
DOI: 10.3390/e24030383
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Counteracting a Saturation Attack in Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution Using an Adjustable Optical Filter Embedded in Homodyne Detector

Abstract: A saturation attack can be employed for compromising the practical security of continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD). In this paper, we suggest a countermeasure approach to resisting this attack by embedding an adjustable optical filter (AOF) in the CVQKD system. Numerical simulations illustrate the effects of the AOF-enabled countermeasure on the performance in terms of the secret key rate and transmission distance. The legal participants can trace back the information that has been eavesdroppe… Show more

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Cited by 2 publications
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“…In the actual optical fiber channel, the power of the optical pulse decreases with the transmission distance, so it is difficult to meet the detection requirements of coherent state in long-distance QKD. Additionally, eavesdropper can attack CV-QKD by controlling LO, such as the reported calibration attack [7], saturation attack [8,9], local oscillator jitter attack [10,11], which poses a threat to the security of communication systems. A feasible method is that the signal light and LO light in the system are generated by two independent lasers [12,13], and thus the security loopholes caused by LO transmission in public channel can be avoided.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the actual optical fiber channel, the power of the optical pulse decreases with the transmission distance, so it is difficult to meet the detection requirements of coherent state in long-distance QKD. Additionally, eavesdropper can attack CV-QKD by controlling LO, such as the reported calibration attack [7], saturation attack [8,9], local oscillator jitter attack [10,11], which poses a threat to the security of communication systems. A feasible method is that the signal light and LO light in the system are generated by two independent lasers [12,13], and thus the security loopholes caused by LO transmission in public channel can be avoided.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%