Saturation attack on discretely modulated continuous-variable quantum key distribution over an atmospheric turbulence channel

Abstract

Continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) over an atmosphere channel provides the possibility of global coverage, which is threatened by the imperfection of actual devices. Exploiting imperfections of practical devices, an eavesdropper steals the information between legal participants by performing the potential saturation-induced attacks on the homodyne detector. In this paper, we demonstrate the feasibility of the potential saturation attack in discretely modulated (DM) CVQKD over atmospheric turbulence. Subsequently, a countermeasure is suggested by using an adjustable optical filter (AOF) to attenuate the estimated parameter with the measured value in the finite linearity domain, where the attenuated data can be compensated. Numerical simulations illustrate the effects of the saturation attack on the performance of the AOF-based CVQKD system. We find that legal participants evaluate the information that has been eavesdropped because the secret key rate is made negative.