Costs of fisheries management: the cases of Iceland, Norway and Newfoundland

Árnason, Ragnar; Hannesson, Rögnvaldur; Schrank, William E.

doi:10.1016/s0308-597x(99)00029-9

Cited by 61 publications

(37 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…In contrast, IAFs may be viewed as generating a win-win situation: better sustainability outcomes at a lower overall cost of management (including transfers). Indeed, a recent comparison of Iceland, Norway, and Newfoundland showed that the costs of fisheries management, not including government financial transfers, were lowest in Iceland, the country that has gone the furthest to implement secure fishing rights in any of these three jurisdictions (Arnason et al 2003).…”

Section: Transferability Costs Returns and Subsidiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incentive-based approaches to sustainable fisheries

Grafton

Árnason

Bjørndal

et al. 2006

Can. J. Fish. Aquat. Sci.

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347

239

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Abstract:The failures of traditional target-species management have led many to propose an ecosystem approach to fisheries to promote sustainability. The ecosystem approach is necessary, especially to account for fishery-ecosystem interactions, but by itself is not sufficient to address two important factors contributing to unsustainable fisheries: inappropriate incentives bearing on fishers and the ineffective governance that frequently exists in commercial, developed fisheries managed primarily by total-harvest limits and input controls. We contend that much greater emphasis must be placed on fisher motivation when managing fisheries. Using evidence from more than a dozen natural experiments in commercial fisheries, we argue that incentive-based approaches that better specify community and individual harvest or territorial rights and price ecosystem services and that are coupled with public research, monitoring, and effective oversight promote sustainable fisheries. 710 Résumé : Les échecs des aménagements traditionnels centrés sur les espèces-cibles ont incité plusieurs chercheurs à proposer des approches halieutiques basées sur les écosystèmes pour favoriser les pêches durables. L'approche écosys-témique est nécessaire, en particulier, pour tenir compte des interactions pêche-écosystème; elle ne suffit pas, cependant, par elle-même pour régler deux facteurs importants qui contribuent à rendre les pêches non durables : les incitations insuffisantes pour les pêcheurs et la gestion inefficace souvent présente dans les pêches commerciales déve-loppées qui sont régies principalement par des limites à la récolte totale et par des contrôles d'entrée. Nous croyons qu'on doit mettre beaucoup plus l'accent sur la motivation des pêcheurs dans la gestion de la pêche. En utilisant des données provenant de plus d'une douzaine d'expériences naturelles de pêche commerciale, nous cherchons à démontrer que des approches fondées sur les incitations qui précisent mieux la communauté, les récoltes individuelles et les droits territoriaux et qui évaluent aussi financièrement les services de l'écosystème, couplées avec de la recherche gouvernementale, de la surveillance et de la gestion efficace, promeuvent les pêches commerciales durables.[Traduit par la Rédaction] Grafton et al.

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Section: Transferability Costs Returns and Subsidiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incentive-based approaches to sustainable fisheries

Grafton

Árnason

Bjørndal

et al. 2006

Can. J. Fish. Aquat. Sci.

Self Cite

347

239

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“…The cost of enforcing property rights in fisheries is high as fishing operations are difficult to control (see e.g. Arnason et al, 2000). The marginal benefits from full compliance are likely lower than the marginal enforcement costs, and hence, perfect quota enforcement is unlikely.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quota Enforcement and Capital Investment in Natural Resource Industries

Lazkano

2016

Marine Resource Economics

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We investigate the relationship between quota enforcement, compliance, and capital accumulation in ITQ regulated fisheries. Over-extraction and over-capacity represent two of the main fisheries management challenges, and we aim to model and analyze the two jointly. In a stylized resource model, quota violating and complying firms invest in capital, buy quotas, and choose their harvest. We show that in the short run, more capacity increases illegal extraction, while a well-functioning quota market partially alleviates this effect. We also show how tougher enforcement yields a double benefit by directly improving compliance, and by indirectly reducing incentives to invest in capacity, which improves future compliance. Our analysis thus contributes to the literature on market-based management of renewable resources.

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“…In particular, we find that fishermen who emphasise economic motives believe in a lower likelihood that their papers will be inspected than fishermen who explain non-compliance in terms of non-economic motives. However, increasing fishery control has often been found to be a relatively costly way to achieve compliance (Arnason, Hannesson and Shrank, 2000). For this reason, increasing the involvement of fishermen in the regulatory process is often suggested as a means of reducing non-compliance.…”

Section: Discussion and Policy Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%