Costs and Cover: Explaining the Onset of Ceasefires in Civil Conflict

Abstract

Ceasefires are common in civil conflict. Yet we have surprisingly little comparative analysis of why and under what conditions they occur. A ceasefire provides temporary relief from the costs of conflict, but also generates its own costs. Building on this logic, we argue that conflict parties are more likely to accept the costs associated with a ceasefire when the conflict costs are greater, in particular, when: violence is intense; there are higher levels of ‘collateral damage’; and the parties lack international support. Second, we contend that ceasefires are also more likely in those periods in which the audience costs associated with entering into an arrangement are lower, specifically, when the parties have some form of ‘political cover’, such as during mediation. We find support for both arguments in an analysis of a new dataset capturing all ceasefire in civil conflict from 1989-2020, using a series of dyad fixed effect models.

Introducing the ETH/PRIO Civil Conflict Ceasefire Dataset

“…As for most conflict-prediction systems, prior violence is an important predictor in the ViEWS model. Yet, as shown by Clayton et al (2022b) an increase in fatalities is also associated with an increase in the likelihood of a ceasefire, which should significantly lower the likelihood of short-term future violence. Moreover, Bara and Clayton (2022) show that ceasefires in one dyad can increase the government's reputation for cooperation, which can lead to violence also declining in other dyads within the same state.…”

“…(e.g. see, Clayton et al 2022b); How does the broader political context shape the outcomes of ceasefires (e.g. see, Braithwaite & Butcher, 2022); and how do ceasefires influence the negotiation process?…”

Ceasefires in Civil Conflict: A Research Agenda

“…Beyond questions of sequencing, Clayton et al (2022b) show that the timing of ceasefires is shaped by patterns of conflict violence, whereby conflict parties are more likely to enter into a ceasefire in periods when the costs associated with conflict are greater; in particular, when conflict violence is more intense, when there are higher levels of "collateral civilian damage," when the opposition has international support, and when the conflict either has just started or continues for a long period. They also show that ceasefires are more likely when the audience costs associated with entering into an arrangement are lower, specifically, when the parties have some form of "political cover" (e.g.…”

Your Reputation Precedes You: Ceasefires and Cooperative Credibility During Civil Conflict

“…Next, we develop an empirical strategy linking our argument to ceasefires in civil conflict. Ceasefires are a regular feature during civil conflict, and often an integral part of the bargaining process (Clayton et al 2022b). States can use ceasefire to build a reputation for cooperation.…”