Ceasefires in Civil Conflict: A Research Agenda

Nygård

Strand

et al. 2022

Self Cite

This article introduces the Civil Conflict CeaseFire (CF) dataset. The CF data covers all ceasefires in civil conflict between 1989 and 2020, including multilateral, bilateral and unilateral arrangements, ranging from verbal arrangements to detailed written agreements. In total, the CF data includes 2202 ceasefires across 66 countries and 109 civil conflicts. The data feature information on the actors involved in the ceasefire, and the class, purpose, coverage, and end date of the ceasefire. The CF data provide an empirical basis to assess the conditions that give rise to ceasefires, how ceasefires affect the dynamics of conflict, and the role of a ceasefire in the peace process. This article presents the rationale underlying the data collection, the coding rules and procedures, and how this data can be used for analysis.

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Introducing the ETH/PRIO Civil Conflict Ceasefire Dataset

Nygård

Strand

et al. 2022

Self Cite

“…We focus instead on ceasefires as a driver of states’ reputation. A ceasefire is an arrangement that includes an explicitly declared intention, by at least one belligerent, to suspend hostilities from a specific point in time (Clayton et al 2022c; Clayton et al 2022a). Ceasefires are a common feature in almost all civil conflicts.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Ceasefires can occur at any point during a civil conflict, and serve a number of different purposes (Clayton et al 2022a; Clayton et al 2022c; Clayton, Nathan, and Wiehler 2021). One common function is signaling cooperative intentions to an opponent (Clayton and Sticher 2021).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…While it may be difficult to identify the underlying purpose of a ceasefire agreement ex ante (Clayton, Nathan, and Wiehler 2021), some ceasefires arguably signal more of a cooperative intent than others, and so are more likely generate cooperative reputation. Ceasefires are a diverse collection of agreements which vary depending on the context in which they are declared and the purpose they serve (Clayton et al 2022c; Bara, Clayton, and Rustad 2021). We can make use of this variation between ceasefires (in terms of the signals they send) to examine our causal mechanism.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Your Reputation Precedes You: Ceasefires and Cooperative Credibility During Civil Conflict

Bara

2022

Self Cite

How does the state’s behavior in negotiations with one non-state group influence the behavior of other non-state actors? We argue that the dynamics of different conflicts within the same country are interdependent, and that a state develops a reputation through its interactions with each conflict party. This reputation provides a valuable source of information that other groups use to judge the state’s cooperative intentions. When a state develops a reputation for cooperation, this increases the likelihood of (indirect) reciprocation from other groups. More specifically, we argue that when states enter into (and honor) a ceasefire with one rebel group, they demonstrate a credible reputation for cooperation. A credible reputation for cooperation, we posit, increases the likelihood that other conflict parties enter into ceasefires with the state, or that they de-escalate their military activities. We test our claims using the new civil conflict ceasefire dataset and find support for our argument.

Costs and Cover: Explaining the Onset of Ceasefires in Civil Conflict

Nygård

Rustad

et al. 2022

Self Cite

Ceasefires are common in civil conflict. Yet we have surprisingly little comparative analysis of why and under what conditions they occur. A ceasefire provides temporary relief from the costs of conflict, but also generates its own costs. Building on this logic, we argue that conflict parties are more likely to accept the costs associated with a ceasefire when the conflict costs are greater, in particular, when: violence is intense; there are higher levels of ‘collateral damage’; and the parties lack international support. Second, we contend that ceasefires are also more likely in those periods in which the audience costs associated with entering into an arrangement are lower, specifically, when the parties have some form of ‘political cover’, such as during mediation. We find support for both arguments in an analysis of a new dataset capturing all ceasefire in civil conflict from 1989-2020, using a series of dyad fixed effect models.