Costs and benefits of judgment errors: Implications for debiasing.

Arkes, Hal R.

doi:10.1037/0033-2909.110.3.486

Cited by 678 publications

(459 citation statements)

References 94 publications

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“…The psychophysical principle that underlies this weighting function (i.e., sensitivity diminishes with an increase in distance from the reference point) is not limited to probability (see Arkes, 1991). One hundred percent is a maximum, not only for probability, but for other attributes as well.…”

Section: Rutgers University Piscataway New Jerseymentioning

confidence: 99%

'100% of anything looks good': The appeal of one hundred percent

Chapman

2009

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review

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Section: Rutgers University Piscataway New Jerseymentioning

confidence: 99%

'100% of anything looks good': The appeal of one hundred percent

Chapman

2009

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review

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“…The effect has been obtained from subject samples in a variety of different countries (Lee et al, 1995;Yates et al, 1989) and in subject samples of adolescents as well as adults (Newman, 1984). Although the finding of an overconfidence bias can be substantially modified by variables such as item difficulty, I task type, and expertise (Keren, 1991;Ronis & Yates, 1987;Schneider, 1995), it is so ubiquitous that it is routinely classified as a perva-sive cognitive bias (Arkes, 1991;Baron, 1994;Fischhoff, 1982).…”

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confidence: 99%

The domain specificity and generality of overconfidence: Individual differences in performance estimation bias

West

Stanovich

1997

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review

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One hundred twenty-three college students performed a knowledge assessment task and a game of motor skill in which they had to predict their performance before each block of trials. There was a bias in the direction of overconfidence on both tasks, even though the latter involved the motor domain, did not require the use of numeric probabilities, and allowed predictions to be made by using an aggregate judgment made in a frequentist mode. An analysis of individual differences indicated that there was considerable domain specificity in confidence judgments. However, participants who persevered in showing overconfidence in the motor task-despite previous feedback revealing their overconfident performance predictions-were significantly more overconfident in the knowledge calibration task than were participants who moderated their motor performance predictions so as to remove their bias toward overconfidence. The latter finding is consistent with explanations of overconfidence effects that implicate mechanisms with some degree of domain generality.

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“…2 See Viscusi (1995 p. 108), Baron et al (2001), Bleichrodt et al (2001), Sunstein (2003, 2008: nudge), Loewenstein and Ubel (2008 §1.2), and Infante et al (2016). For references to early work, see Fischhoff (1982) and Arkes (1991). Lapidus and Sigot (2000 §5) discuss Bentham's ideas on this issue.…”

Section: Predicting Others' Choicesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Improving one’s choices by putting oneself in others’ shoes – An experimental analysis

Rohde

Wakker

2017

J Risk Uncertain

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This paper investigates how letting people predict others' choices under risk affects subsequent own choices. We find an improvement of strong rationality (risk neutrality) for losses in own choices, but no such improvement for gains. There is no improvement of weak rationality (avoiding preference reversals). Overall, risk aversion in own choices increases. Conversely, for the effects of own choices on predicting for others, the risk aversion predicted in others' choices is reduced if preceded by own choices, for both gains and losses. Remarkably, we find a new probability matching paradox at the group level. Relative to preceding studies on the effects of predicting others' choices, we added real incentives, pure framing effects, and simplicity of stimuli. Our stimuli were maximally targeted towards our research questions.

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Costs and benefits of judgment errors: Implications for debiasing.

Abstract: This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

Cited by 678 publications

References 94 publications

'100% of anything looks good': The appeal of one hundred percent

'100% of anything looks good': The appeal of one hundred percent

The domain specificity and generality of overconfidence: Individual differences in performance estimation bias

Improving one’s choices by putting oneself in others’ shoes – An experimental analysis

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