2017
DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2016.09.004
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Costly punishment in the ultimatum game evokes moral concern, in particular when framed as payoff reduction

Abstract: The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the published version of record.

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Cited by 63 publications
(71 citation statements)
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“…In their seminal paper about the origins of prosocial preferences, Rand et al (2012) argue that people do not have a single set of social preferences, but rather that more complex models of cooperation are needed. In line with the argument, studies show that prosociality is not per se driven by social preferences, but also influenced by the consideration of moral righteousness of a behavior (Capraro and Rand, 2018;Eriksson et al, 2017) and social norms (Krupka and Weber, 2013). Like these authors, we also believe that cooperative behavior may be a result of complex interactions of various factors, and that there is no sole factor that determines cooperative behavior.…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 75%
“…In their seminal paper about the origins of prosocial preferences, Rand et al (2012) argue that people do not have a single set of social preferences, but rather that more complex models of cooperation are needed. In line with the argument, studies show that prosociality is not per se driven by social preferences, but also influenced by the consideration of moral righteousness of a behavior (Capraro and Rand, 2018;Eriksson et al, 2017) and social norms (Krupka and Weber, 2013). Like these authors, we also believe that cooperative behavior may be a result of complex interactions of various factors, and that there is no sole factor that determines cooperative behavior.…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 75%
“…Consequently, third‐party judges may use punishment as their “heuristic,” “knee‐jerk,” or “instinctual” response (Tinghög, Andersson, Bonn et al ., ). Although punishment can elicit widespread moral concern (Eriksson, Strimling, et al ., ), it also has high social value. Third‐parties might actually believe that deterrence by punishment is the most effective means to enforce social justice, or the most justified response; on the other hand, punishment might just be a more intuitive, easier‐to‐enact response that takes less cognitive load (Tinghög et al ., ).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Converging evidence suggests that prosociality in anonymous, one-shot interactions is not solely motivated by outcome-based social preferences, but that it is also motivated by what individuals perceive to be the morally right action (Bicchieri, 2005;DellaVigna et al, 2012;Eriksson et al, 2017;Kimbrough & Vostroktunov, 2016;Krupka & Weber, 2013); perhaps serving to maintain a positive moral self-image (Aquino & Reed, 2002;Dunning, 2007). Building on this work, recent experimental evidence advanced the hypothesis that a generalized morality preference drives prosocial behavior in anonymous, one-shot interactions like that in Dictator and Prisoner's Dilemma games (Capraro & Rand, 2018).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%