Cost-Sharing Mechanisms for A Wood Forest Product Supply Chain under Carbon Cap-and-Trade

Sun, Mingjun; Peng, Hongjun; Wang, Shuai

doi:10.3390/su10124345

Cited by 12 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…Meanwhile, for illustration purposes, we present a numerical example here. According to the actual situation of the carbon sink transaction and the relevant data in the literature [39], the values of the parameters are shown in Table 2. (2) dr/dθ 1 > 0, dr/dθ 2 < 0.…”

Section: Discussion and Numerical Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Both the scale of the carbon sink forest and the average carbon limit level affect the market price of the carbon sink: When the scale of the carbon sink forest expands, the forestry enterprise can provide more forestry carbon sinks, so the price of the forestry carbon sinks will drop. On the other hand, when the carbon limit policy of the government is looser, the market demand of the manufacturing enterprise will be smaller, the price will also drop [39]. Therefore, the carbon sink price is…”

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confidence: 98%

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Strategies of Forestry Carbon Sink under Forest Insurance and Subsidies

Song

Peng

2019

Sustainability

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We take the forest insurance supply chain, composed of a forestry enterprise and an insurance company, as the research object. The forestry carbon sink, operated by the forestry enterprise, is the subject matter of insurance. The Stackelberg game model is constructed to study the optimal strategies of the forestry enterprise and insurance company under the forest insurance mechanism, as well as the impact of government subsidies, probability of deforestation, and carbon limit level on the decision-making and profit of the forestry enterprise and insurance company. The results show that the larger the carbon limit, the looser carbon restraint policy, which causes the forestry enterprise to reduce the scale of carbon sink forest, and the insurance company lowers the premium level. As the probability of deforestation increases, both the scale of the carbon sink forest and the premium level will decrease. Direct subsidies for the premiums of the forestry enterprise are conducive to expanding the scale of carbon sink forest, but will lead to the insurance company improving the premium level. Providing indirect subsidies to the insurance company’s operating costs will not only expand the scale of the carbon sink forest, but also lower the premium level. In the case of the same number of premium subsidies, indirect subsidies are more effective than direct subsidies in increasing the forestry enterprise’s income and promoting it to expand the forest scale.

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Section: Discussion and Numerical Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 98%

Strategies of Forestry Carbon Sink under Forest Insurance and Subsidies

Song

Peng

2019

Sustainability

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“…The number of CSR reports by Chinese companies increased by nearly 53% in the decade from 2006 to 2015 [1]. Increasing attention has been paid to CSR activities in China's capital market [2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10], and this increased attention has provided many opportunities for scholars to conduct quantitative research on CSR activities and related information disclosure activities based on China's capital market [11][12][13][14]. In this regard, a large number of studies have focused on the driving factors and economic consequences of CSR activities and related disclosure activities of Chinese companies, especially in the past five years.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do CSR Ratings Converge in China? A Comparison Between RKS and Hexun Scores

Zhong

Liao

et al. 2019

Sustainability

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Rankings (RKS) and Hexun are the two most widely used corporate social responsibility (CSR) ratings in research on CSR in China’s capital market. These scores are used as a proxy for CSR performance and disclosure quality. However, research is lacking on the validity of measuring CSR performance and disclosure quality, as well as the convergent validity between these scores. In this paper, a comparative and quantitative analysis was performed for the period 2010–2017, and the following results were obtained: (1) Based on a comparison of the rating methods, information sources, and other factors, RKS is more suitable for measuring the CSR disclosure quality, while Hexun is more suitable for measuring the CSR performance; (2) based on a Spearman correlation analysis, the convergent validity between these two scores is very low, particularly after 2013; and (3) the sub-indicator weights of the RKS system always maintain a high stability, whereas those of the Hexun system suffer from severe fluctuations starting in 2013.

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“…Song and He [14] found that the decentralized supply chain can be coordinated by a freshness-keeping, cost-sharing, and revenue-sharing contract. Sun et al [15] designed and analyzed the carbon emission reduction cost-sharing and carbon sink costsharing contracts, respectively. Several incentive mechanisms were investigated by Yoo and Cheong [7] for collaborative product quality improvement in a buyer-driven supply chain, and the impacts of those mechanisms on supply chain performance are studied.…”

Section: Contract Design and Coordination Of A Supply Chainmentioning

confidence: 99%

Collaborative Innovation with Dynamic Incentive Contracts in a Supply Chain

Hao

Chen

Hong

2020

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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The collection and sharing of consumers’ knowledge by retailers can help manufacturers improve the innovation level of products, thereby improving the performance of supply chain. However, due to the cost of collecting consumers’ knowledge, the wholesale price contract can no longer coordinate supply chain members effectively. It is necessary to study the problem how the retailers are encouraged to make more efforts for the cooperative innovation with manufacturers. This paper introduces two dynamic incentive contracts for improving collaborative innovation level in a two-player supply chain, and the impacts of these contracts on supply chain’s performance are investigated, by using a Stackelberg differential game model. The manufacturer, as a Stackelberg leader, determines the R&D investment while the retailer is responsible for the retail price and the efforts in collection of the consumer’s information (or preference) to the products. The model incorporates a wholesale price contract and two incentive contracts to better understand how the manufacturer can facilitate the retailer’s efforts in the collection of consumer’s information and increase the profits of the members of supply chain. Our results suggest that the optimal profit of the supply chain, the retailer’s efforts in the collection of consumer’s knowledge, the retail price, and the innovation level under the reward incentive contract are higher than their counterparts in other contracts. In particular, the retailer’s optimal effort under the reward incentive contract is even higher than the one in the centralized decision scenario. However, if the manufacturer commits an effort target to the retailer, it shows that the retailer’s optimal effort is independent of the target. The manufacturer’s optimal R&D investments are constants in the three contracts under the dynamic setting. Furthermore, numerical simulations show that the effort target has little impact on profits of the supply chain although it affects the decision making of supply chain members to some extent, whereas the retailer’s marginal reward offered by the manufacturer influences the innovation level of product and the supply chain’s profit significantly.

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Cost-Sharing Mechanisms for A Wood Forest Product Supply Chain under Carbon Cap-and-Trade

Cited by 12 publications

References 34 publications

Strategies of Forestry Carbon Sink under Forest Insurance and Subsidies

Strategies of Forestry Carbon Sink under Forest Insurance and Subsidies

Do CSR Ratings Converge in China? A Comparison Between RKS and Hexun Scores

Collaborative Innovation with Dynamic Incentive Contracts in a Supply Chain

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