Cosmic Outlooks and Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics

McPherson, David

doi:10.5840/ipq201542234

Cited by 7 publications

(7 citation statements)

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“…, 208–210, 222. The last two paragraphs overlap somewhat with a similar account of neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism in McPherson (2015).…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 64%

Homo religiosus: does spirituality have a place in neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics?

McPherson¹

2015

Rel. Stud.

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In this article I seek to show the importance of spirituality for a neo-Aristotelian account of ‘the good life’. First, I lay out my account of spirituality. Second, I discuss why the issue of the place of spirituality in the good life has often either been ignored or explicitly excluded from consideration by neo-Aristotelians. I suggest that a lot turns on how one understands the ‘ethical naturalism’ to which neo-Aristotelians are committed. Finally, I argue that through a deeper exploration of the evaluative standpoint from within our human form of life as ‘meaning-seeking animals’ we can come to better appreciate the importance of spirituality for human beings throughout recorded history up to the present and why we can be described as homo religiosus.

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“…, 208–210, 222. The last two paragraphs overlap somewhat with a similar account of neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism in McPherson (2015).…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 64%

Homo religiosus: does spirituality have a place in neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics?

McPherson¹

2015

Rel. Stud.

Self Cite

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“…Taylor, as MacPherson sees it, has articulated and defended a moral ontology that (alone) can inform and make sense of our moral phenomenology. He also draws an interesting link between Taylor's views and those espoused in Nagel's recent work on Mind and cosmos (2012) which also argues for a teleological understanding of the universe, albeit more along standard Aristotelian lines than those inspired by theism (MacPherson, 2015).…”

Section: Do We Need Supernaturalism To Make Sense Of Enchanted Flourishing?mentioning

confidence: 89%

“…In the background of those criticisms lurk some well-known themes from Taylor's general moral philosophy, such as his notion of 'strong evaluations' of things we ought to value, by comparison to which typical neo-Aristotelian functional evaluations of the good of human beings, as analogous to that of plants and animals, will seem 'weak ' and insipid (MacPherson, 2012). The reason is that the functional explanations (drawing on Aristotle's insight that we should think biologically about how living beings thrive) arguably fail to make sense of our moral phenomenology, for instance of how we pass second-order moral judgements about our own first-order moral judgements (MacPherson, 2015).…”

Section: Are Standard Accounts Of Flourishing Flat and Disenchanted?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Flourishing as the aim of education: towards an extended, ‘enchanted’ Aristotelian account

Kristjánsson

2016

Oxford Review of Education

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Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.When citing, please reference the published version. Take down policyWhile the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.

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“…Focusing on horizontal transcendence in this article is a methodological choice and does not rule out the possibility of vertical transcendence toward ideal values (Kristjansson, 2016) and toward the divine (MacPherson, 2015;Taylor, 2007).…”

Section: Con Clus Ionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Vertical transcendence is furthermore the basis of our shared humanity and our uniqueness, which characterizes our action. Focusing on horizontal transcendence in this article is a methodological choice and does not rule out the possibility of vertical transcendence toward ideal values (Kristjansson, 2016) and toward the divine (MacPherson, 2015; Taylor, 2007).…”

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confidence: 99%

A personalist approach to business ethics: New perspectives for virtue ethics and servant leadership

Scalzo

Akrivou

González

2022

Business Ethics Env & Resp

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This article has a twofold purpose: first, it explores how Leonardo Polo's personalist anthropology enriches and enhances neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics and second, it highlights how this specific personalist approach brings new perspectives to servant leadership. The recently revived neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics tradition finds that MacIntyre's scholarship significantly contributes to virtue ethics in business—particularly his conception of practices, institutions, and internal/external goods. However, we argue that some of his latest insights about the virtues of acknowledged dependence and human vulnerability remain underdeveloped because of the underlying anthropology that neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics relies on. To overcome this limitation, we introduce Polo's transcendental anthropology as a possible foundation of a personalist approach that enriches virtue ethics. To do so, we address how transcendental anthropology can enrich two central aspects of virtue ethics, namely (1) the understanding of human beings and their flourishing and (2) the relationship of virtue to praxis and human work. Finally, to address the practical implications for business leadership and work that can derive from assuming transcendental anthropology, we address how servant leadership acquires a new perspective in light of this personalism and its logic of gift, highlighting interpersonal self‐giving as a way of service.

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Cosmic Outlooks and Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics

Cited by 7 publications

References 0 publications

Homo religiosus: does spirituality have a place in neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics?

Homo religiosus: does spirituality have a place in neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics?

Flourishing as the aim of education: towards an extended, ‘enchanted’ Aristotelian account

A personalist approach to business ethics: New perspectives for virtue ethics and servant leadership

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