Corruption, Public Investment, and Growth

Tanzi, Vito; Davoodi, Hamid

doi:10.5089/9781451929515.001

Cited by 587 publications

(391 citation statements)

References 7 publications

(2 reference statements)

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“…This leads to low effective investment in power generation and roads. As noted earlier, Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) finds that high levels of corruption lowers government revenues, expenditures on operations and maintenance, quality of public infrastructure and productivity for public government expenditure. As we may expect all of these four areas are negatively correlated with income per worker.…”

Section: Calibrationmentioning

confidence: 98%

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Impact of the business environment on output and productivity in Africa

Bah

Fang

2015

Journal of Development Economics

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Section: Calibrationmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…Other transmission channels are: lower government revenues, lower expenditures on operations and maintenance, lower quality of public infrastructure and lower productivity for public government expenditure (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997).…”

Section: Literature Review On Areas Of the Business Environmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Impact of the business environment on output and productivity in Africa

Bah

Fang

2015

Journal of Development Economics

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“…That the latter are a reflection of poor governance (ie low institutional development) is strongly affirmed by many studies that use some metric of the degree of corruption to explain ineffective government. Thus, Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) show how corruption results in low expenditures on health and education (where bribery opportunities are limited), and large but poorly executed public investment projects (where bribery opportunities are legion). An excellent summary of how well corruption indices explain statistically various performance measures, such as growth or investment ratios, is found in the work of Mauro (1997) and Wei (1998).…”

Section: Early Empirical Work In the New Growth Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Institutions Matter in Transition, But So Do Policies

2003

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This paper analyses the importance of developing market-enhancing institutions for restoring economic growth in transition economies during 1991-98. The paper's main finding is that the development of an institutional framework has indeed a significant positive impact on growth, but that progress in achieving macroeconomic stabilisation and implementing broad-based economic reforms remain the key determinants of growth in transition economies. Comparative Economic Studies (2003) 45, 2-24.

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“…We support our formalization on the work of Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) and Bu (2006). Note that the constraint σ u S < 1 must be satisfied to allow for a positive depreciation of physical capital.…”

Section: Capital Accumulationmentioning

confidence: 72%

“…factors linked with institutions. For instance, Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) showed that higher corruption is associated with lower expenditures on operations and maintenance of physical capital, which calls for a relationship between institutions and the depreciation of physical capital, exactly the link that we uncover.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 76%

Social infrastructure and the preservation of physical capital: Equilibria and transitional dynamics

Soares

Sequeira

Marques

et al. 2018

Applied Mathematics and Computation

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We study the mechanisms according to which social infrastructure influences the preservation of physical capital and, consequently, economic growth. The model considers that social infrastructure is a specific type of human capital, which acts in order to preserve already existing physical capital, by, e.g., reducing the incentive for rent seeking or corruption. Using an innovative methodology in economics, the Gröbner bases, we study the equilibrium of our model and conclude for the existence of two feasible steady-states or of unicity according to different combinations of parameters, highlighting a trade-off between consumption and production on one hand and social infrastructure and physical capital accumulation, on the other. We also present sufficient conditions for saddle-path stability. Finally, we describe transitional dynamics and calculate welfare effects from which we show that strengthening social infrastructure increases welfare.JEL Classification: C02, C62, O41, O43.

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Corruption, Public Investment, and Growth

Cited by 587 publications

References 7 publications

Impact of the business environment on output and productivity in Africa

Impact of the business environment on output and productivity in Africa

Institutions Matter in Transition, But So Do Policies

Social infrastructure and the preservation of physical capital: Equilibria and transitional dynamics

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