2019
DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2019.1613508
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Corruption governance and its dynamic stability based on a three-party evolutionary game with the government, the public, and public officials

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Cited by 9 publications
(5 citation statements)
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References 13 publications
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“…Igualmente (Zheng & Liao, 2019) afirma que la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos depende no solo de su voluntad subjetiva, sino también de la tasa de éxito de las investigaciones gubernamentales y las denuncias públicas. Se evidencia que los gobiernos locales no promueven los mecanismos de participación ciudadana para empoderar, capacitar e incentivar a los ciudadanos (Aquije, López & Garay, 2021), a quienes el Estado debería asistirles toda clase de capacitación como fiscalizadores para tener éxito en la culminación de proyectos y buen uso de los presupuestos.…”
Section: Discussionunclassified
“…Igualmente (Zheng & Liao, 2019) afirma que la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos depende no solo de su voluntad subjetiva, sino también de la tasa de éxito de las investigaciones gubernamentales y las denuncias públicas. Se evidencia que los gobiernos locales no promueven los mecanismos de participación ciudadana para empoderar, capacitar e incentivar a los ciudadanos (Aquije, López & Garay, 2021), a quienes el Estado debería asistirles toda clase de capacitación como fiscalizadores para tener éxito en la culminación de proyectos y buen uso de los presupuestos.…”
Section: Discussionunclassified
“…Their results of the research showed that the government's formulation of reasonable subsidies and carbon tax policies can increase the enthusiasm of agricultural enterprises and farmers to participate in low‐carbon agricultural technology innovation. Zheng and Liao (2019) used the evolutionary game method to construct a tripartite evolutionary game model and made suggestions for the government to improve the anticorruption supervision mechanism. It can be seen that the evolutionary game method is widely used in the study of behavioral games between subjects with certain interest relationships, but there are relatively few related studies on the interactive behavior of subjects in a supply chain.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Corruption is extremely harmful to social stability, may hinder economic development, and affect the development of political parties [ 1 , 2 ]. Corruption in construction projects has become a key factor affecting the construction market environment and the sustainable development of external construction [ 3 ].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Advanced screening through the official website of China Judicial Documents revealed that the number of first instance judgments on corruption cases in the engineering industry dropped from 5062 in 2016 to 1718 in 2020. Although the number of related cases has been controlled to a certain extent, the related problems are still very serious [ 2 ]. In conclusion, it is imperative to explore the propagation mechanism of corruption in construction projects for better preventing corruption in the construction projects.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%