Corruption and energy efficiency in OECD countries: theory and evidence

Fredriksson, Per G.; Vollebergh, Herman R.J.; Dijkgraaf, Elbert

doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2003.08.001

Cited by 250 publications

(138 citation statements)

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“…Research identifies that corruption affects outcomes in natural resource management and conservation in two direct as well as two indirect ways: First, it may influence policymakers to refrain from enacting stricter legislation, for instance, to regulate pollution or the harvesting of a certain resource (Fredriksson et al 2004). Second, it could decrease the effectiveness of existing legislation during their phase of implementation, as bribery may hamper law enforcement (Smith and Walpole 2007).…”

Section: Corruption and Rule Violations: Theoretical Expectations Andmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corruption and Violations of Conservation Rules: A Survey Experiment with Resource Users

Sundström

2016

World Development

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Small-scale corruption in government administrations that govern natural resources is believed to have a negative impact on conservation management. Yet, while corruption is said to obstruct the implementation of conservation policies, for instance as bribery may enable poaching in protected reserves, it is an underexplored area of research. This study investigates the effect of corruption, others' compliance behavior, and support for regulations on rule-violating intentions. In a betweensubjects experiment, a sample of resource users active in South African small-scale fisheries (N = 201) answered questions about rule-violating intentions after reading one of four scenarios, each depicting a different situation of corruption among officials that enforce regulations and compliance behavior of other resource users. The results show that resource users are more likely to state rule-violating intentions when corruption among inspectors is widespread. Moreover, there is an interaction effect with support for conservation regulations, suggesting that the effect of corruption is stronger among individuals who do not support such rules. These findings lend further support for the proposition that to improve the effectiveness of conservation policy, more effort is needed to reduce bribery among government officials, such as rangers and inspectors that enforce natural resource regulations.

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Section: Corruption and Rule Violations: Theoretical Expectations Andmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corruption and Violations of Conservation Rules: A Survey Experiment with Resource Users

Sundström

2016

World Development

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“…The existing literature on lobbying and corruption is vast (see, e.g., Jain (2001) and Aidt (2003) for surveys). While the previous literature argues that industry lobbying in the environmental policy area is affected by government corruption (see, e.g., Fredriksson et al, 2004), the role of corruption for the impact of environmental lobbying remains cloudy.…”

Section: Hypothesis Specificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Kyoto Protocol cooperation: Does government corruption facilitate environmental lobbying?

2007

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Does environmental lobbying affect the probability of environmental treaty ratification? Does the level of government corruption play a role for the success of such lobbying? In this paper, we propose that a more corruptible government may be more responsive to the demands of the environmental lobby. We use several stratified hazard models and panel data from 170 countries on the timing of Kyoto Protocol ratification to test this hypothesis. We find that increased environmental lobby group activity raises the probability of ratification, and the effect rises with the degree of corruption.Keywords: Corruption; political economy; agreements; ratification; environmentalism.* We thank a helpful referee, Dale Jorgenson, Johanna Jussila, Angeliki Kourelis, John List, and Karl-Gustav Löfgren for helpful comments and suggestions, and Marie-Hélène Bauer and Muthukumara Mani for kindly providing part of the data. This paper was previously circulated under the title "Kyoto Protocol Cooperation: Why Do Some Countries Ratify Earlier Than Others?" The usual disclaimers apply.Corresponding author: Eric Neumayer, LSE, London WC2A 2AE, +44-207-9557598 (ph.), +44-207-9557412 (fax), e.neumayer@lse.ac.uk. KYOTO PROTOCOL COOPERATION: DOES GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION FACILITATE ENVIRONMENTAL LOBBYING?October 26, 2006 AbstractDoes environmental lobbying affect the probability of environmental treaty ratification? Does the level of government corruption play a role for the success of such lobbying? In this paper, we propose that a more corruptible government may be more responsive to the demands of the environmental lobby. We use several stratified hazard models and panel data from 170 countries on the timing of Kyoto Protocol ratification to test this hypothesis. We find that increased environmental lobby group activity raises the probability of ratification, and the effect rises with the degree of corruption.

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“…Second, energy intensive incumbent industries with access to significant resources tend to engage in lobbying for government support and seek to influence policy decisions. For instance, Fredriksson and Svensson (2003) argue that strong industry lobbies may engage in corruption to reduce environmental policy stringency while Fredriksson, Vollebergh, and Dijkgraaf (2004) remark that incumbent industries utilize their lobbying power to oppose structural transformation. Third, larger sectors may imply more firms/actors, and this would result in higher coordination costs of such lobbying activities (Olson 1965;Fredriksson, Vollebergh, and Dijkgraaf 2004).…”

Section: Hypothesis 3 (H3)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In line with previous literature (Fredriksson, Vollebergh, and Dijkgraaf 2004;Costa-Campi et al 2014), we use the value-added share of energyintensive industries (Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel, Chemicals and Chemical Products, Rubber and Plastics, Water and Air Transport, Electricity, Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal Mining) 13 in the economy computed using industrial value added data from the WIOD database (Timmer et al 2015) as an indicator of market-size, lobbying power, and coordination costs. Table 7.1 summarizes the main proxy variables that are used to measure the key drivers behind the four hypotheses described in this section.…”

Section: Hypothesis 3 (H3)mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Political Economy of Clean Energy Transitions

Arndt¹,

Miller²,

Tarp³

et al. 2017

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials contained in any third party website referenced in this work. Terms of use: Documents inIt is permitted to reuse, share and adapt this work, subject to the following terms:Attribution -appropriate credit is given to the original work, the copyright holder and creator, and any changes made to the work are properly indicated.Non-Commercial -the work, or any adaptation of the work, may not be used, distributed or reproduced in any format, by any means, for commercial purposes.Share-Alike -the work, or any adaptation of the work is distributed under the same licence terms as the original, with a URL link provided to the licence.Some rights reserved. ForewordSustainable energy transitions involve the shift of resources between competing industrial sectors and political constituencies. Stakeholders in this process have varying degrees of political and economic power, and understanding how political economic factors influence clean energy transitions is crucial to effective policy formulation and facilitating transitions to sustainable energy systems. In partnership with the Joint Institute for Strategic Energy Analysis (JISEA), UNU-WIDER gathered together a substantial group of experts from around the world-from both developed and developing countries-to launch a multidisciplinary research project seeking to contribute to our enhanced understanding of these factors. The project sought to facilitate an energy transition that will generate very large environmental and economic benefits, particularly over the long run. The beneficiaries of clean energy transitions are highly diffuse and include future generations not yet born. This book is the distilled essence of the cross-cutting academic project. I express my sincere and professional appreciation to the large group of expert authors for their dedication to the project, and to my fellow editors in helping bring together the book for readers to enjoy and absorb along with the findings and policy implications.

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Corruption and energy efficiency in OECD countries: theory and evidence

Cited by 250 publications

References 41 publications

Corruption and Violations of Conservation Rules: A Survey Experiment with Resource Users

Corruption and Violations of Conservation Rules: A Survey Experiment with Resource Users

Kyoto Protocol cooperation: Does government corruption facilitate environmental lobbying?

The Political Economy of Clean Energy Transitions

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