PRELIMINARY AbstractRecent trade papers find that exporting firms are more productive, produce higher quality goods, and use more advanced technologies. In this paper we explore the implications of exports and technology upgrading on an under-explored aspect of wage inequality-gender inequality. We build a model with old and new technologies which require different amounts of white and blue-collar tasks. White and blue collar tasks can be performed by male or female workers.Reminiscent of Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) in which computers replace the need for routine physical tasks, the new technology in our model replaces the need for physically demanding skills, "brawn," and men are replaced by women in blue-collar tasks but not in white-collar tasks. Using establishment level data from Mexico, we investigate the link between tariff reductions associated with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), exports, and demand for female workers. Consistent with the previous literature and the predictions of our model, we find that tariff reductions increased exports through the entry of new firms into the export sector. We find evidence that these newly exporting firms updated their machinery and equipment and replaced male blue-collar workers with female blue-collar workers. JEL: codes.

Evidence from the International Crime Victimization Survey and the World Business Environment Survey suggests that actual corruption experience is a weak predictor of reported corruption perception, and that some of the factors commonly found to “reduce” corruption, such as economic development, democratic institutions or Protestant traditions, systematically bias corruption perception indices downward from corruption experience. In addition, perception indices are influenced by absolute (as opposed to relative) levels of corruption, which tends to penalize large countries, and they exhibit diminishing sensitivity to both absolute and relative corruption, indicating that they may better capture differences among countries with low levels of corruption than among highly corrupt ones. Individual characteristics such as education, age, or employment status, and firm‐level characteristics such as the number of competitors are also found to influence corruption perceptions holding experience constant.

Does environmental lobbying affect the probability of environmental treaty ratification? Does the level of government corruption play a role for the success of such lobbying? In this paper, we propose that a more corruptible government may be more responsive to the demands of the environmental lobby. We use several stratified hazard models and panel data from 170 countries on the timing of Kyoto Protocol ratification to test this hypothesis. We find that increased environmental lobby group activity raises the probability of ratification, and the effect rises with the degree of corruption.Keywords: Corruption; political economy; agreements; ratification; environmentalism.* We thank a helpful referee, Dale Jorgenson, Johanna Jussila, Angeliki Kourelis, John List, and Karl-Gustav Löfgren for helpful comments and suggestions, and Marie-Hélène Bauer and Muthukumara Mani for kindly providing part of the data. This paper was previously circulated under the title "Kyoto Protocol Cooperation: Why Do Some Countries Ratify Earlier Than Others?" The usual disclaimers apply.Corresponding author: Eric Neumayer, LSE, London WC2A 2AE, +44-207-9557598 (ph.), +44-207-9557412 (fax), e.neumayer@lse.ac.uk. KYOTO PROTOCOL COOPERATION: DOES GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION FACILITATE ENVIRONMENTAL LOBBYING?October 26, 2006 AbstractDoes environmental lobbying affect the probability of environmental treaty ratification? Does the level of government corruption play a role for the success of such lobbying? In this paper, we propose that a more corruptible government may be more responsive to the demands of the environmental lobby. We use several stratified hazard models and panel data from 170 countries on the timing of Kyoto Protocol ratification to test this hypothesis. We find that increased environmental lobby group activity raises the probability of ratification, and the effect rises with the degree of corruption.

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We consider a model where firms differ in their productivity and workers are differentiated by skill and gender. A reduction in tariffs induces more productive firms to modernize their technology and enter the export market. New technologies involve computerized production processes and lower the need for physically demanding skills. As a result, the relative wage and employment of women improves in blue-collar tasks, but not in white-collar tasks. We empirically confirm these theoretical predictions using a panel of Mexican establishments and the tariff reductions associated with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).