Corporatism and Union Democracy: The British Miners and Incomes Policy, 1973-74

Negotiating the Italian Pension Reform with the Unions: Lessons for Corporatist Theory

“…For example, Lehmbruch's (1979) and Pizzorno's (1978) remarks about the tendency of particularly weak governments to share responsibility for unpopular policies with labor and employer organizations, Olson's (1982) argument that encompassingness makes groups more willing to take a broad view of their organizational interests, and Katzenstein's (1985) argument that perceived economic vulnerability provides a stimulus for domestic actors to cooperate with one another, all resonate with various aspects of the Italian case. However, the theory's traditional emphasis on hierarchical and internally undemocratic interest groups (Schmitter 1979;Panitch 1979;Pizzorno 1978;Offe 1981;Wolfe 1985;Streeck 1994) appears to be incompatible with developments in Italy. In contrastwith standard neo-corporatist theory, the Italian pension reform shows that organizational democracy is potentially an asset, not a liability, for reformist union leaders.…”

“…Concerning membership compliance with organizational policies, the neo-corporatist literature of the 1970s and 1980s implicitly assumed and sometimes explicitly argued that for union organizations to ensure rank-and-file acquiescence to austerity policy, union leaders had to be equipped with the capacity to impose on workers a series of outcomes they might not voluntarily subscribe to (Schmitter 1979;Panitch 1979;Pizzorno 1978;Wolfe 1985;Streeck 1994). In other words, the labor movements best positioned to participate in concertative policy-making were those in which rank-and-file influence over organizational policy and decision-making was reduced to a minimum through a variety of institutional arrangements like compulsory or semi-compulsory membership, legal recognition, automatic collection of union dues, and public financing.…”

Corporatism and the ‘privileged position’ of business

“…18 Lehmbruch echoes this position in talking of key interest groups tempering their demands 'expressly in regard to the systematic ... requirements of the national economy'. 19 The implausibility of these conceptions lies not only in its, neglect of the demand that there be a specific quid pro quo, but also in its assumption of national interest.…”

The Resurgence of the Italian Confederal Unions: Will it Last?

“…compulsory membership, public or semi-public recognition and/or financing) that allowed them to impose on workers a series of outcomes these might not voluntarily subscribe to (see Offe, 1981, Panitch, 1979, and Pizzorno, 1978. This meant, among other things, that an Aundemocratic@ process of internal decision-making was required (Schmitter, 1979;Wolfe, 1985;Streeck, 1994).…”