“…This may be contrasted to the general and multifaceted purpose of advancing social welfare (Aglietta & Rebérioux, 2005; Johnston, 2009; Sjåfjell, 2009). Shareholder primacy does not have a company law basis; rather it is a short form for a complex mix of perceived market signals and economic incentives, informed by path‐dependent corporate governance assumptions and postulates from U.S.‐based legal‐economic theories (Bruner, 2013; Sjåfjell & Bruner, 2019; Smith, 1988; Sneirson, 2019). This is evidenced through a decade of multijurisdictional comparative company law analysis, which has demonstrated that company laws across jurisdictions give boards as the core decision‐makers discretion to govern the companies in the way they see fit, and that this space is constrained by shareholder primacy (Ireland, 1999; Sjåfjell et al, 2015; Sjåfjell & Bruner, 2019; Stout, 2012, 2013).…”