Corporate Governance in China's Listed Companies

Tam, On Kit

doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.1995.tb00089.x

Cited by 16 publications

(14 citation statements)

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“…The appointment of non-commercially experienced CEOs of listed firms was caused by the majority holdings by the state. Tam (1995) conducted a survey which confirmed that nearly 54% of board vice-chairmen in listed firms in the Chinese stock market were members of the CCP committee. Tam (1995) also suggests a high percentage of CCP members on boards reflect the nature of the continuing bureaucratic power of the administrators and the CCP members.…”

Section: Selective Information Disclosurementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Tam (1995) conducted a survey which confirmed that nearly 54% of board vice-chairmen in listed firms in the Chinese stock market were members of the CCP committee. Tam (1995) also suggests a high percentage of CCP members on boards reflect the nature of the continuing bureaucratic power of the administrators and the CCP members. The CSRC suggests the selection of management personnel of listed firms should be carried out in a fair and transparent manner.…”

Section: Selective Information Disclosurementioning

confidence: 99%

“…CEO duality is another main corporate governance issue among Chinese listed firms, as Tam (1995) and Firth et al (2007) point out. CEO duality has impacted on the effectiveness of a board in its various functions as it undermines the board's independent ability to oversee the senior managers.…”

Section: Selective Information Disclosurementioning

confidence: 99%

“…It has been argued that separating the two roles allows the development of initiatives, innovation and more effective leadership of the firm (Fama & Jensen, 1983). The survey conducted in China by Tam (1995) revealed 60% of board chairmen among listed firms were also the CEOs of firms, and 25% of vice-chairmen were either CEOs or Deputy CEOs. This issue is significant enough to attract the regulatory body's attention.…”

Section: Selective Information Disclosurementioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Voluntary Disclosure in a Changing Regulatory Environment–Evidence from Chinese Stock Market

Qu¹,

Cooper²,

Wise³

et al. 2012

IJEF

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This paper investigates the voluntary disclosure made by 297 Chinese listed firms in their 1995-2006 annual reports. It aims to determine how firms in the Chinese stock market have responded to the coercive pressure exerted upon them by the market regulatory body, the Chinese Security Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in terms of providing transparent information to the stock market. The findings show that over the study period, listed firms have gradually increased their voluntary disclosure. This paper also explores the main characteristics of voluntary disclosure made by listed firms in the Chinese stock market. It is concluded that voluntary disclosure has been adopted by firms to achieve institutional legitimacy in the stock market.

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Section: Selective Information Disclosurementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Selective Information Disclosurementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Selective Information Disclosurementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Selective Information Disclosurementioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Voluntary Disclosure in a Changing Regulatory Environment–Evidence from Chinese Stock Market

Qu¹,

Cooper²,

Wise³

et al. 2012

IJEF

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Instead of direct ownership by some level of government, the largest or only shareholder became a state-owned investment company or asset management company, with more professional enterprise-management knowledge. Although criticized by many researchers (Chen, 2004;Liu, 2000;Jefferson and Singh, 1999;Tam, 1995), the new corporate governance has partially solved the agency problems by selecting more competent managers and establishing appropriate incentive mechanisms related to firm performance. Consequently, these changes have made SOE managers more attentive to customers and the market, in order to enhance performance.…”

Section: Theory and Model Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

An empirical study of SOEs' market orientation in transitional China

Sun

Liu

2006

Asia Pacific J Manage

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Using institutional theory, this paper investigates the antecedents and outcomes of market orientation in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in transitional China. A survey of 274 SOEs demonstrates a strong positive relationship between market orientation and various measures of organizational performance. Additionally, market competitive pressure, formalized corporate governance, and less government control are found to promote market orientation of SOEs in the transitional period. These results support the views that market orientation leads to better performance and that institutional factors should be considered in studies of strategy in Chinese firms. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2006Institution, Market orientation, Performance,

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The impact of corporate governance and external audit on compliance to mandatory disclosure requirements in China

Gao

Kling

2012

Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation

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Corporate Governance in China's Listed Companies

Cited by 16 publications

References 0 publications

Voluntary Disclosure in a Changing Regulatory Environment–Evidence from Chinese Stock Market

Voluntary Disclosure in a Changing Regulatory Environment–Evidence from Chinese Stock Market

An empirical study of SOEs' market orientation in transitional China

The impact of corporate governance and external audit on compliance to mandatory disclosure requirements in China

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