Corporate governance, family ownership and performance

Giovannini, Renato

doi:10.1007/s10997-009-9093-x

Cited by 114 publications

(104 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…They also provide a critical appraisal of the firm's direction, strategy and business approaches, and broaden the boards' perspectives [69]. Furthermore, a 2010 study in Italy found that family presence on the board of directors affects performance negatively, and that the presence of independent directors affects performance positively [70], and another 2010 study found an inverted U-shaped association between the number of family members on the board and performance [71]. A recent study in Taiwan found that family firms with high ownership concentration and low family board representation had a higher performance than those with the opposite characteristics, i.e., low levels of ownership concentration and high family board representation [72].…”

Section: Board Structurementioning

confidence: 99%

Effects of Family Ownership, Debt and Board Composition on Mexican Firms Performance

Martín-Reyna

Durán-Encalada

2015

IJFS

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This study examines the relationship between ownership structure and performance of public firms in Mexico, considering debt and the structure of the board of directors as contextual and institutional factors. This research seeks to explain the mixed results about the relationship of ownership and performance presented by other relevant studies in family and non-family businesses, mainly in emerging countries. The results confirm the positive association between family ownership concentration and performance, calculated by Tobin's Q, showing how the participation of inside shareholders on the board and a low debt level contribute to higher performance. However, the association of these variables with performance shows a contrasting effect in the case of family as compared to non-family businesses. The particular corporate legal context in Mexico could be highlighted as one of the main reasons for these results.

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Section: Board Structurementioning

confidence: 99%

Effects of Family Ownership, Debt and Board Composition on Mexican Firms Performance

Martín-Reyna

Durán-Encalada

2015

IJFS

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“…The same combination of components can be found in very early and quite recent definitions: Generational transfer in interdependent subsystems (Dyer, 1964;Jaffe & Lane, 2004), voting control (Barry, 1975;Barnes & Hershon, 1976;Rue & Ibrahim, 1996), family management (Alcorn, 1982;Heck & Scannell 1999), family ownership (Tagiuri & Davis, 1982;Giovannini 2010) and ownership-management (Stern 1986;Donckels & Lambrecht 1999).…”

Section: Components and Essence Of Family Firmsmentioning

confidence: 75%

The Benefits of Family Ownership, Control and Management on Financial Performance of Firms

2010

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

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“…Different functions of BOC and BOD offer a lot of choices for the majority shareholder to involve owner family members in the BOC or BOD, and even in both boards. This apparent may increase the potential agency problem and information asymmetry between the two separate boards (Giovannini, 2010;Zhao & Millet-Reyes, 2007;Firth et al, 2007) and expect to provide a different impression on the performance of the firm. To see the impact of family involvement on firm performance as a whole including the physical assets and intellectual assets, this study uses VAIC method which is different from commonly used methods.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Two-tier board system and Indonesian family owned firms performance

Arifai¹,

Tran²,

Moslehpour³

et al. 2018

10.5267/j.msl

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The two-tier board system practiced in Indonesia provides greater opportunity for the majority shareholders to place representative on board which may expropriate interest of minority shareholders and increase information asymmetry. This study looks at the influence of family ownership on firm's performance, by differentiating the influence of family ownership from family involvement in companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. Family ownership is measured based on family's equity ownership in the firm and family's involvement. This study explores family involvement in threefold: involvement in the board of commissioners, involvement in the board of directors and involvement in both boards. Firm performance is measured based on Value Added Intellectual Coefficient (VAIC) which comprises of capital employed efficiency, human capital efficiency, and structural capital efficiency. Data was collected for a period of three years from 2007 to 2009 on 155 firms which were identified as family firms. The findings show that family ownership has a positive influence on firm performance. Family involvement, however, shows mixed results. Family involvement in the board of commissioners has a positive but insignificant influence on firm's performance. Family involvement in the board of directors has a negative influence on firm's performance. Family involvement in both boards has a positive influence on firm performance. The findings suggest that family involvement in both boards creates a balance between the supervisory function and the management function, thus resulting in a more effective monitoring of firm's management.

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Corporate governance, family ownership and performance

Abstract: Corporate governance, Family ownership, Performance, Agency theory, Stewardship theory, Contingency theory, G34, G32, L25,

Cited by 114 publications

References 25 publications

Effects of Family Ownership, Debt and Board Composition on Mexican Firms Performance

Effects of Family Ownership, Debt and Board Composition on Mexican Firms Performance

The Benefits of Family Ownership, Control and Management on Financial Performance of Firms

Two-tier board system and Indonesian family owned firms performance

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