Corporate governance and information transparency in Taiwan’s public firms: The moderating effect of family ownership

Abstract

This study incorporates insights from both institutional and family socioemotional wealth perspectives with agency theory to examine the relationships among governance practices, family ownership, and information disclosure quality. Employing a sample of 516 publicly listed firms in Taiwan over a period of 5 years (2006)(2007)(2008)(2009)(2010), we found that high levels of board independence and board activity have a significant positive effect on disclosure quality. Further, family ownership positively moderated the relationship between board independence and disclosure quality. This relationship is stronger with a higher level of family ownership. The results support the institutional proposition that family-owned firms that pursue socioemotional wealth are more likely to promote information transparency to gain legitimacy and enhance their reputations with outside stakeholders.

Discretionary Disclosure of Listed Non-Financial Firms in an Emerging Market: Evidence from Ghana

“…Umpteen studies have been conducted in recent times focusing on measuring the association between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure. Studies like Al Markati and Hamdan (2017) in Bahrain, Akhtaruddin et al (2009) in Malaysia, Al-Janadi and Rahman 2013in Saudi Arabia, Adelopo (2011) in Nigeria, Elfeky (2017) in Egypt, Li andQi (2008) China, Donnelly andMulcahy (2008) in Ireland, Eng and Mak (2003) in Singapore, Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan (2010) in Kuwait, Rouf (2011) in Bangladesh, Kent (2008) in Australia, Liu, Valenti and Chen (2016) in Taiwan, Agyei and Gyamerah (2016); Bokpin and Issahaq (2009) both in Ghana all examined corporate governance mechanism that influences the level of voluntary disclosure.…”

El efecto de factores de gobierno corporativo en la calidad de la información financiera en empresas familiares y no familiares

“…Consequently, it constitutes a key mechanism for aligning interests between shareholders and managers, by reducing information asymmetries and improving the quality of financial information (Callao-Gastón et al, 2008;Monterrey-Mayoral & Sánchez-Segura, 2008;Torchia & Calabrò, 2016). To complement these studies, and considering that family governance differs from non-family firms' governance (Aguilera & Crespi-Cladera, 2012;Jaggi et al, 2009;Liu et al, 2016), we first analyse to what extent accounting information is influenced by CEO non-duality. CEO non-duality consists of separating the CEO's responsibility for strategic functions from those of the board of directors.…”

“…However, as a consequence of their long-term orientation (Lumpkin et al, 2010), family firms are more sensitive to image problems and the need to convey an environment of trust and transparency in outside financial reporting. This concern for reputation may influence family firms to adopt singular governance practices and to present higher quality financial information (Liu et al, 2016). These inconsistencies in the corporate governance of family firms constitute the second research gap identified.…”

New Insights into Non-Listed Family SMEs in Spain: Board Social Capital, Board Effectiveness, and Sustainable Performance

“…The BoDs of non-listed family SMEs are less regulated and more informal than those of publicly-held family firms. Some scholars highlight that many family SMEs only have a BoDs 'on paper' and do not use it to its full extent [7]. Hence, we know little about the antecedents of BoDs effectiveness and its influence on the sustainable performance of family SMEs.…”