2005
DOI: 10.4337/9781845425470
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Corporate Governance Adrift

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Cited by 222 publications
(57 citation statements)
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“…These two precise characteristics of myopia underlie the financial logic criticised by Espeland and Hirsch (1990), Lazonick and O'Sullivan (2000), and Aglietta and Rebérioux (2005), and the potential for the myopic reduction of real value suggested by Jensen et al (2004). Company executives can destroy long-term value in the way shown by Graham et al (2005), because they fall into the two myopia-related traps identified in the present study.…”
Section: Perceptions Of Share Pricesupporting
confidence: 56%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…These two precise characteristics of myopia underlie the financial logic criticised by Espeland and Hirsch (1990), Lazonick and O'Sullivan (2000), and Aglietta and Rebérioux (2005), and the potential for the myopic reduction of real value suggested by Jensen et al (2004). Company executives can destroy long-term value in the way shown by Graham et al (2005), because they fall into the two myopia-related traps identified in the present study.…”
Section: Perceptions Of Share Pricesupporting
confidence: 56%
“…First, share price has been identified as long-term oriented due to it being formed based on all the future cash flows of a company (Fama, 1965;Brickley et al, 1985;Puffer and Weintrop, 1991). Second, and conversely, it has been claimed to be short-term oriented due to its links to myopia in financial markets, which emphasise quarterly earnings reporting and continuous visibility (Espeland and Hirsch, 1990;Aglietta and Rebérioux, 2005;Rappaport, 2005).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…At least three avenues for future research are involved here. The first consists in examining the relationship between global hybrids and other attempts at defining prevailing modes of regulation, such as financial capitalism (Aglietta & Rebérioux 2004), global governance (Brand 2005) or spatial nestedness (Boyer 2003). The second complements this basic assessment by analysing more systematically how the core analytical categories of global hybrids relate to the institutional forms and hierarchies of regulation theory, in particular as far as the status of the state, forms of competition and the inscription in the global economy are concerned.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In particular, from the inter-war period onwards, more and more institutional and structural barriers to that capital market discipline were being erected, such that, as Michel Aglietta and Antoine Rebérioux observe, at least until the 1970s 'corporate governance, though assuming a different form on each side of the Atlantic, nevertheless concurred on one point: the weakness of market mechanisms in general, and of capital market mechanisms in particular'. 43 In the United States, the lack of capital market discipline was the result not so much of the dispersion of ownership per se, but of the growth of state law protecting firms from hostile takeovers from the 1930s onwards. 44 The resulting absence of a market for corporate control was a crucial element in the rise of 'corporate liberalism', 45 in which the modern corporation became the central organisation of capitalist society and relatively detached from the property-owning bourgeoisie, giving space to a relatively autonomous managerial class.…”
Section: Marketisation: Institutional Preconditions For Marketsmentioning
confidence: 99%