Coordination costs and research joint ventures

Falvey, Rodney E.; Poyago‐Theotoky, Joanna; Teerasuwannajak, Khemarat Talerngsri

doi:10.1016/j.econmod.2013.03.005

Cited by 16 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Please note that the equilibrium involves complete information revelation. This corroborates our central intuition that the issue of information revelation is intimately tied to the possibility of 5 Given that A can only mix between the true type and no announcement, note that a rational belief for B should put zero mass on all types other than what was announced. Pooling among different types can only occur if "no announcement" realizes.…”

Section: Proofsupporting

confidence: 77%

“…These phenomena have to contend with coordination issues such as strategic uncertainty and have been analyzed in detail in the literature on antitrust. For instance, for research joint ventures, ref [5] finds that ignoring costs of coordination in the formation of joint ventures incorrectly inflates the value of the partnership and that competition in R&D might yield a welfare enhancing outcome.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Given that q NR is independent of θ, (5) can hold for at most one θ, so that the probability of revelation is zero. 8 The intuition for non-revelation has to do with coordination possibilities in the second stage game.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Coordination and Private Information Revelation

Saha

Chowdhury

2018

Games

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This paper examines a persuasion game between two agents with one-sided asymmetric information, where the informed agent can reveal her private information prior to playing a Battle-of-the-Sexes coordination game. There is a close connection between the extent of information revelation and the possibility of coordination failure; while, in the absence of any coordination failure, there exist equilibria with full disclosure, in the presence of strategic uncertainty in coordination there exists an equilibrium with no information revelation. We provide a purification argument for the non-existence result, as well demonstrate that it is robust to several extensions, including both-sided asymmetric information and imprecise information revelation.

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Section: Proofsupporting

confidence: 77%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Coordination and Private Information Revelation

Saha

Chowdhury

2018

Games

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“…Investment risk includes also insufficient possibilities of the enterprise that are unable to satisfy the demand, so its potential competition gains development opportunities. In this situation, outsourcing is also a solution, since it is usually easier and faster to establish cooperation with another partner than to build another production enterprise [5], [6], [7]. This is a good solution, especially when it is not sure, whether it is a momentary jump of demand [8].…”

Section: Suggested Model Of An Innovative Enterprisementioning

confidence: 99%

Cost model of an innovative company based on outsourcing and agile methods

Chlebus¹,

Kowalski²,

Minkus³

2017

Topics in Economics, Business and Management (EBM)

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The paper describes a logistic model of an enterprise based on outsourcing and the agile methods. The purpose of this model is reduction of risk in conditions of business uncertainty. The model was constructed in order to place as much as possible cost sources outside the enterprise. In the paper, two groups of processes are described: product design and supply chain management. The design process is so built that cost sources are located at the customer. In certain sectors, it is possible to create also an additional value and increase the customer's satisfaction. It is described how to set the customer as a designer and to create a system protecting against design errors. On the example of this process, estimation of process costs is described.

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“…d ' Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988;Kamien et al, 1992;Poyago-Theotoky, 1995, 1999Atallah, 2005;Falvey et al, 2013;Manasakis et al, 2014). 4 Such analysis departs from Arrow's (1962) approach and that of subsequent contributions (e.g.…”

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confidence: 99%

Merger and Innovation Incentives in a Differentiated Industry

Kesavayuth

Lee

Zikos

2017

International Journal of the Economics of Business

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In this paper, we consider a duopoly with product differentiation and examine the interaction between merger and innovation incentives. The analysis reveals that a merger tends to discourage innovation, unless the investment cost is sufficiently low. This result holds whether or not side payments between firms are allowed. When side payments are permitted, a bilateral merger-to-monopoly is always profitable, a standard result in the literature. When side payments are not permitted, however, we show that a merger is not profitable when the efficiency of the new technology is relatively high and the investment cost is below a particular level.

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Coordination costs and research joint ventures

Cited by 16 publications

References 16 publications

Coordination and Private Information Revelation

Coordination and Private Information Revelation

Cost model of an innovative company based on outsourcing and agile methods

Merger and Innovation Incentives in a Differentiated Industry

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