Coordinating collaboration in contractually different complex construction projects

Abstract

Structured abstract:Purpose -The study compares the coordination of supply chain networks in contractually different complex construction projects. Design/methodology/approach -A comparative case study of the coordination of collaborative work in two successful hospital construction projects was conducted. One of the projects applied multiple dyadic contracts, whereas the other project applied one multiparty contract between the parties. The projects were located in the USA. Data was collected by observing the coordination on the construction sites for six weeks and by conducting 72 interviews. Findings -The paper shows that depending on the contract type, the timing and extent of complementary procedural coordination differs during projects. Compared with one multiparty contract, the multiple dyadic contracts needed to be complemented during the design phase with three additional procedural coordination mechanisms: 1) organizational design, 2) processes for collaborative work, and 3) integrated concurrent engineering sessions. Additionally, common rules of conduct were taken into use during the construction phase. However, regardless of the contract type, procedural coordination mechanisms, such as colocated working, collaborative decision making in inter-organizational meetings, a liaison role, and shared project goals were needed throughout the projects. Practical implications -If multiple dyadic contracts are applied, procedural coordination mechanisms have to be co-created by all supply chain parties at the beginning of the project. Originality/value -The study provides understanding on successful contractual and complementary procedural coordination mechanisms of supply chain networks in complex construction projects.

Governing Collaborative Project Delivery as a Common-Pool Resource Scenario

“…There is an extraordinary amount of in-depth literature regarding collaborative project delivery models. In IPD scholarship alone there are numerous examples of comparative case studies (Ballard et al, 2015; Cheng et al, 2012, 2016; Cohen, 2010; Denerolle, 2013); management strategies (Fischer et al, 2017); impact on desirable project characteristics, such as trust, innovation, and supply chain collaboration (Hall et al, 2018; Lavikka et al, 2015; Pishdad-Bozorgi & Beliveau, 2016; Zhang et al, 2020); quantifications of IPD project outcomes compared to other types of project delivery methods (El Asmar et al, 2013, 2016; Franz et al, 2017; Mesa et al, 2016); and theorizations of ideal IPD profit pool distributions using cooperative game theory (Du et al, 2019; Teng et al, 2019). As Ostrom noted in her own scholarship on common-pool resource scenarios, such literature holds rich accounts and models developed by field researchers who have invested years of effort to obtain detailed information about the strategies adopted by appropriators (Ostrom, 2015).…”

A neo-institutional view of the transaction cost drivers of construction supply chain risk management

“…As illustrated in this example, customary institutions remain central to China's SCRM strategies in CSC, despite ongoing regulatory reforms (Peng, 2000;Peng, 2003;Monticelli et al, 2018). Furthermore, to deliver successful construction projects, local, international, and Sino-foreign CSC actors require common regulatory and procedural goals under conditions of uncertainty and task interdependence (Lavikka et al, 2015;Peng, 2000). In this regard, Lavikka et al (2015) argued that contractual coordination for reducing transaction costs must be augmented with procedural coordination to account for the behavioral, technical, socio-cultural, and socio-political realities of collaborative risk management.…”

Estabelecendo Relacionamentos com Empresas Chinesas: O Papel do Guanxi no Desenvolvimento da Confiança de um Projeto Colaborativo

“…Os resultados contribuíram para duas áreas pouco exploradas de pesquisa: 1) a influência de diferentes tipos de experiências entre compradores e fornecedores; e, 2) a possibilidade de analisar mais de perto o impacto específico das disposições contratuais. Além disso, os achados indicaram que, enquanto o número de cláusulas contratuais de controle aumenta, as negociações cooperativas diminuem, aumentando a coordenação contratual da governança (LAVIKKA, SMEDS & JAATINEN, 2015). Adicionalmente, em disputas onde o comprador e o fornecedor tinham experiência relacional cooperativa, o aumento da governança contratual por meio de controle levava a consequências indesejáveis -como o número crescente de negociações competitivas.…”