2014
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2013.09.012
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Coordinating a dual-channel supply chain with risk-averse under a two-way revenue sharing contract

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Cited by 295 publications
(161 citation statements)
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“…Based on relevant literature [see 6,7,24,25], the parameters of the model are consistent with the model consumptions. In this study, we set ɶ (1) Effects of a ∆ and k on the decision-making variables under centralized decision…”
Section: Dual-channel Supply Chain Decisions In a Centralized Decisiomentioning
confidence: 63%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Based on relevant literature [see 6,7,24,25], the parameters of the model are consistent with the model consumptions. In this study, we set ɶ (1) Effects of a ∆ and k on the decision-making variables under centralized decision…”
Section: Dual-channel Supply Chain Decisions In a Centralized Decisiomentioning
confidence: 63%
“…Choi et al [23] and Xiao and Choi [24] used the mean-variance theory to discuss the relationship between the decision-making of a retailer with risk characteristic and the expected profit and variance. Xu et al [25] established the mean-variance model for risk-averse dual-channel supply chain and assumed that the pricing of a risk-averse channel is lower than a risk-neutral one. Liu et al [26] studied the effect of risk aversion on the optimal policies of a dual-channel supply chain under complete and asymmetric information cases.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Referring to Xu et al [52], adopt a two-way revenue-sharing contract that can be described as follows: the manufacturer obtains a fraction of the revenue generated by the capitalconstrained retailer, and the retailer simultaneously obtains a fraction of the revenue generated by the manufacturer. Assume that (0 < < 1) represents the retailer's share of the sales profit in the retail channel and that (0 < < 1) represents the manufacturer's share of the gross profit in the wholesale channel.…”
Section: Coordinate the Green Supply Chain With Finance Constraintsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…They showed that the retailer made a lower share of the total supply chain in the presence of peer-induced fairness, and the experiment suggested that peer-induced fairness was more salient. Xu et al [28] proved that the price set by a risk-averse dual-channel supply chain was lower than a risk-neutral dual-channel supply chain. They also pointed out that the manufacturer provided a contract to the retailer, which not only coordinated the dual-channel supply chain, but also ensured that both stakeholders achieve a win-win situation, which can promote cooperation between the retailer and the manufacturer.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%