Research on Pricing and Coordination Strategy of a Sustainable Green Supply Chain with a Capital-Constrained Retailer

Li-ming, Zhao; Li, Ling; Yao, Song; Liu, Cong; Wu, Yujie

doi:10.1155/2018/6845970

Cited by 17 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 51 publications

(50 reference statements)

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“…As early as in 2002, more than 27% of the consumers in OECD countries can be considered as "green consumers", who have strong willingness to buy environmentally friendly products even for costing a little more, while the proportion of the European green consumers is 75% in 2008 compared to 31% in 2005 [1]. Such consumer environmental awareness has a great impact on the product demand [2] and hence promotes the emission reduction in the industry [3,4]. To provide information for customers, some carbon labelling schemes are established.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Myopic versus Farsighted Behaviors in a Low-Carbon Supply Chain with Reference Emission Effects

et al. 2019

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The increased carbon emissions cause relatively climate deterioration and attract more attention of governments, consumers, and enterprises to the low-carbon manufacturing. This paper considers a dynamic supply chain, which is composed of a manufacturer and a retailer, in the presence of the cap-and-trade regulation and the consumers’ reference emission effects. To investigate the manufacturer’s behavior choice and its impacts on the emission reduction and pricing strategies together with the profits of both the channel members, we develop a Stackelberg differential game model in which the manufacturer acts in both myopic and farsighted manners. By comparing the equilibrium strategies, it can be found that the farsighted manufacturer always prefers to keep a lower level of emission reduction. When the emission permit price is relatively high, the wholesale/retail price is lower if the manufacturer is myopic and hence benefits consumers. In addition, there exists a dilemma that the manufacturer is willing to act in a farsighted manner but the retailer looks forward to a partnership with the myopic manufacturer. For a relatively high price of emission permit, adopting myopic strategies results in a better performance of the whole supply chain.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Myopic versus Farsighted Behaviors in a Low-Carbon Supply Chain with Reference Emission Effects

et al. 2019

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“…Hence, finally, the optimal EE innovating strategy * ( ) and the corresponding EE level * ( ) of the first subproblem in Case 1, respectively, remain the same as (17) and (18). Similarly, for the second subproblem in Case 1, we can get the optimal EE innovating strategy * ( ) and the corresponding EE level * ( ), respectively, as (21) and (22). Besides, the optimal EE innovating strategies and EE levels are all the same as the corresponding optimal solutions stated in Section 4 as in Case 2 and thus is omitted here.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Accordingly, this paper aims to characterize EE standard setting and EE innovating equilibrium strategies of a policy maker and numerous competing producers, taking into consideration both a market differentiation framework and the evolving EE level. We establish a game between a policy maker and several producers in a vertical green supply chain [20,21]. Specifically, the game is playedà la Stackelberg with the policy maker acting as the leader and all the producers as the followers, and then the producers to decide the respective EE innovating strategy.…”

Section: Complexitymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Standard Setting with Considerations of Energy Efficiency Evolution and Market Competition

Dai

Zhang

2019

Complexity

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EE (energy efficiency) level, an indispensable index reflecting the environmental performance of products, can be improved by the EE innovating effort of the producer. Considering both the evolution of EE level and market differentiation, we develop a Stackelberg differential game between a policy maker who sets the EE standard and multiple competing producers with different initial EE levels who decide the EE innovation simultaneously. As there exist numerous possible reactions for each producer under a given EE standard about whether to meet the EE standard or not, whether there exists an equilibrium is what we pay special attention to. We find that, under a given EE standard, there indeed exists a unique optimal reaction for each producer, and there exists an equilibrium. Moreover, we find that as green awareness or initial EE level increases, both the EE standard and EE innovation increase. Additionally, if policy maker pays more attention to consumer welfare and environmental performance rather than profit of producer, a more strict EE standard would be set. Also, both less information about the initial EE level and more competition among producers induce lower EE standard and social welfare.

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“…Ren et al develop a supermarket-farmer coordination model in an agricultural commodity supply chain that distributes the profit and improves its effectiveness [32]. Zhao et al study the green supply chains under capital constraints and design a new two-way revenue-sharing contract to coordinate the green supply chain and obtain a win-win outcome [33]. However, these studies do not take the weather-related yield environment into consideration.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Risk Transfer Mechanism for Agricultural Products Supply Chain Based on Weather Index Insurance

et al. 2018

Complexity

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The risk management for agricultural products supply chain is more complex than that for typical manufacturing supply chain. Agricultural production is vulnerable to severe weather such as heavy rain, cyclones, and cold wave, which challenges the matching of random output with random demand for agricultural products supply chains. The goal of this paper is to design an effective risk transfer mechanism for managing severe weather risks so as to ensure the stable operation of the agricultural products supply chain. We study the coordination of two-level agricultural products supply chain with a single company and a single farmer under the influence of severe weather. Taking rainstorm weather as an example, this paper designs a risk transfer mechanism based on weather index (rainfall) insurance: "rainfall index insurance + revenue sharing + risk transfer fee." It is found that this risk transfer mechanism can overcome distortion of the farmer's agricultural investment level under the influence of severe weather. When the contract parameters meet certain conditions, using the risk transfer mechanism can achieve the supply chain coordination and a win-win situation. More importantly, weather change does not affect the Pareto improvement of the company and the farmer under the risk transfer mechanism. In addition, we also find that the company can incentivize the farmer to purchase weather index insurance and use the insurance market to shift the severe weather risk encountered during the agricultural production to protect the company's and farmer's income and the stable operation of the supply chain.

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Research on Pricing and Coordination Strategy of a Sustainable Green Supply Chain with a Capital-Constrained Retailer

Cited by 17 publications

References 51 publications

Myopic versus Farsighted Behaviors in a Low-Carbon Supply Chain with Reference Emission Effects

Myopic versus Farsighted Behaviors in a Low-Carbon Supply Chain with Reference Emission Effects

Standard Setting with Considerations of Energy Efficiency Evolution and Market Competition

Risk Transfer Mechanism for Agricultural Products Supply Chain Based on Weather Index Insurance

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