Coordinated decisions for substitutable products in a common retailer supply chain

Hsieh, Chen-Chiung; Wu, Chi Hao

doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2008.02.019

Cited by 51 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 47 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The issue of supply chain coordination mechanism of two manufacturers providing products to one retailer is studied in Hsieh, etc. [14] . Paralar [15] sets up an analytical model of one retailer and two suppliers under the assumption of random production.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing decisions in a dual-channel supply chain with dominant manufacturer

Liu

2012

Icsssm12

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper investigates the dominance strategies exerted by the dominant manufacture for maintaining its dominant position in the channel system which is operating substitutable products and what influences they have on members of the whole channel system and the consumers. As to the channel system with two manufactures and one retailer, the pricing decisions are depicted to compare the optimal choice made by the system members under dominant manufactures' wholesale price dominance strategy and channel dominance strategy, respectively. It shows that only the dominant manufacturer can necessarily benefit from the wholesale price dominance strategy. Furthermore, both dominant manufacturer and retailer can benefit from the channel dominance strategy, and consumers can also benefit from it. The channel dominance strategy, however, is not always the optimal choice for the dominant manufacturer. Whatever dominance strategy is it, the weak manufacturer will suffer loss, but in channel dominance strategy, the market share of weak manufacturer will increase under certain circumstances.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing decisions in a dual-channel supply chain with dominant manufacturer

Liu

2012

Icsssm12

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…They focus on uncovering the effect of demand uncertainty on the implementation of buyback. Other buyback contract related studies include Choi et al (2008), Hsieh and Wu (2009), Gürler and Yılmaz (2010), Hou et al (2010), Ryu and Yücesan (2010), Chen (2011), Ai et al (2012), He and Zhao (2012), Shen and Willems (2012), Choi et al (2013), Shen et al (2013), Devangan et al (2013), Lee et al (2013), Wu (2013), Zhang et al (2014), Ohmura and Matsuo (2016). This paper is related to the above reviewed studies on buyback contracts as we also explore the use of buyback in achieving coordination.…”

Section: Buyback Contractsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pareto Improving Supply Chain Coordination Under a Money-Back Guarantee Service Program

2017

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. Money-back guarantee (MBG) is a well-known service offered by many retailers. Under the MBG policy, a purchased item by a consumer can be returned for a full refund. In this paper, we explore a supply chain (SC) system comprising of one retailer, which offers the money-back guarantee policy and faces a stochastic demand. With a given supply contract offered by the supplier, the retailer makes decisions on the order quantity and the market coverage of the money-back guarantee service. With reference to real-world practices, we examine three models, namely, (1) the traditional wholesale pricing model without the buyback contract, (2) the model with a buyback contract (between the supplier and the retailer) for unsold items, and (3) a dual-buyback (DB) contract model for both unsold and consumer returned items. We find that using the buyback contract alone for unsold items cannot achieve Pareto improving supply chain coordination, whereas the DB contract can. Numerical findings also indicate that the DB contract can lead to an expansion of the money-back guarantee service program to cover more customers. This paper's findings support the implementation of the DB contract, which is commonly seen in the industry, for efficient supply chain management in the presence of the money-back guarantee service program.

show abstract

“…Consequently, the wholesale prices of products are unattainable numerically and the manufacturer has to roughly estimate his wholesale price. Therefore, it is assumed here that the wholesale prices of two products are both predetermined, which is very similar to [7].…”

Section: The General Optimal Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Hsieh et al [7] study coordination mechanisms in a supply chain comprised of two suppliers with capacity uncertainties selling differential yet substitutable products through a common retailer who faces random demand of these two products which incorporate price competition. The analytical and empirical results in [8] offer guidelines to e-tailers on how to price their products and decide their service offerings considering price competition.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Equilibrium Decisions in a Two-Echelon Supply Chain under Price and Service Competition

Han

Zhou

2014

Sustainability

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article studies a supply chain composed of a manufacturer and two competing retailers. The manufacturer produces two substitutable products and offers respective service levels to customers who buy one of the two products. Each retailer can only order one kind of product from the manufacturer, and then sell them to the market at a certain sale price. The demands for two products are influenced not only by the service levels the manufacturer provides, but also the sales prices of the two products. Furthermore, we investigate the equilibrium behavior of members in the supply chain with the aid of the Stackelberg game, and discover a number of insights concerning some important parameters. Finally, Numerical analysis is presented to validate our theoretical results and compare channel performances.

show abstract

Coordinated decisions for substitutable products in a common retailer supply chain

Cited by 51 publications

References 47 publications

Pricing decisions in a dual-channel supply chain with dominant manufacturer

Pricing decisions in a dual-channel supply chain with dominant manufacturer

Pareto Improving Supply Chain Coordination Under a Money-Back Guarantee Service Program

The Equilibrium Decisions in a Two-Echelon Supply Chain under Price and Service Competition

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About