2012
DOI: 10.1016/j.comnet.2012.05.008
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Cooperative detection of primary user emulation attacks in CRNs

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Cited by 23 publications
(13 citation statements)
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“…For example, Yuan et al [44] only consider the possibility of television transmitters in their proposal, i.e., PUs with fixed and known PU locations. The cooperative solution that is proposed by León, Hernández-Serrano, and Soriano [54], which specifically targets centralized IEEE 802.22 networks, is based on the same assumption and thus cannot cope with the emulation of PUs that have unknown locations (e.g., wireless microphones), despite its ability to precisely determine the locations of received signals. Blesa et al [55] state that countermeasures based on geo-location are not appropriate for scenarios with mobile PUs and SUs, and, according to Araujo et al [42], mobile attackers can take advantage of their mobility in order to remain undetected.…”
Section: Location-and Distance-based Approachesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, Yuan et al [44] only consider the possibility of television transmitters in their proposal, i.e., PUs with fixed and known PU locations. The cooperative solution that is proposed by León, Hernández-Serrano, and Soriano [54], which specifically targets centralized IEEE 802.22 networks, is based on the same assumption and thus cannot cope with the emulation of PUs that have unknown locations (e.g., wireless microphones), despite its ability to precisely determine the locations of received signals. Blesa et al [55] state that countermeasures based on geo-location are not appropriate for scenarios with mobile PUs and SUs, and, according to Araujo et al [42], mobile attackers can take advantage of their mobility in order to remain undetected.…”
Section: Location-and Distance-based Approachesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…One of the possible applications of TRM is to detect PUE attacks. Various non‐TRM approaches have been proposed to counter PUE attacks such as the following: (1) time difference of arrival applied to estimate the position of a PUE attacker ; (2) belief propagation algorithm applied to detect PUE attackers by comparing the received signal power from its neighbors and that from the PU ; (3) transmitter verification scheme applied to determine whether a given signal is from an honest or malicious PU, and this is carried out by estimating its location and observing its signal characteristics ; (4) a cryptographic link signature can be incorporated into PUs' signal so that channel usage by PUs can be authenticated ; and (5) a hybrid approach of energy detection, cyclostationary feature calculation and artificial neural networks can be applied to detect PUE attacks A(3.4) .…”
Section: Open Issuesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The first category assumes that the PU location is known for the CR users. Therefore, the aim is to determine the location of signal transmitter and compare if with the PU location [9][10][11]. The second one is looking for unique properties of the transmitter such as transient time characteristics [12], local oscillator phase noise [13], etc.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%