Cooperative Decision Making in Common Pool Situations

Meinhardt, Holger Ingmar

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-56136-8

Cited by 19 publications

(10 citation statements)

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“…In addition, concentrating on stylized cooperative bargaining arguments offers some insight into how agreement points can be stabilized. Theoretical results from cooperative game theory that foster the hypothesis -obtained from field studies -that the commons can be successfully managed by selfish individuals have been provided by [7,8,9], and by [22,23].…”

Section: Commons Dilemma Situation and Gamesmentioning

confidence: 90%

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Non-binding agreements and fairness in commons dilemma games

Ostmann

Meinhardt

2007

cent.eur.j.oper.res.

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Usually, common pool games are analyzed without taking into account the cooperative features of the game, even when communication and non-binding agreements are involved. Whereas equilibria are inefficient, negotiations may induce some cooperation and may enhance efficiency. In the paper, we propose to use tools of cooperative game theory to advance the understanding of results in dilemma situations that allow for communication. By doing so, we present a short review of earlier experimental evidence given by Hackett, Schlager, and Walker 1994 (HSW) for the conditional stability of non-binding agreements established in face-to-face multilateral negotiations. For an experimental test, we reanalyze the HSW data set in a game-theoretical analysis of cooperative versions of social dilemma games. The results of cooperative game theory that are most important for the application are explained and interpreted with respect to their meaning for negotiation behavior. Then, theorems are discussed that cooperative social dilemma games are clear (alpha-and beta-values coincide) and that they are convex (it follows that the core is "large"): The main focus is on how arguments of power and fairness can be based on the structure of the game. A second item is how fairness and stability properties of a negotiated (non-binding) agreement can be judged. The use of cheap talk in evaluating experiments reveals that besides the relation of non-cooperative and cooperative solutions, say of equilibria and core, the relation of alpha-, beta-and gamma-values are of importance for the availability of attractive solutions and the stability of the such agreements. In the special case of the HSW scenario, the game shows properties favorable for stable and efficient solutions. Nevertheless, the realized agreements are less efficient than expected. The realized (and stable) agreements can be located between the equilibrium, the egalitarian solution and some fairness solutions. In order to represent the extent to which the subjects obey efficiency and fairness, we present and discuss patterns of the corresponding excess vectors.

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Section: Commons Dilemma Situation and Gamesmentioning

confidence: 90%

“…[23,7,8,9]). Empirical results are reexamined only for two representative games of the Bloomington type.…”

Section: Example (Hsw1)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Non-binding agreements and fairness in commons dilemma games

Ostmann

Meinhardt

2007

cent.eur.j.oper.res.

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“…For that purpose, the partition function form (or coalition structure) approach was treated in [3], which deals with the non-cooperative game solution (i.e., Nash equilibrium for a suitably chosen game in normal form) as well as the cooperative game solution (i.e., (non)existence of core allocations for two types of appropriately chosen cooperative TU-games). In this paper we deal with a fully cooperative game theoretic approach to the common pool situation, following the overall treatment in [6], [7], [8]. Our treatment is fully based on the so-called common pool cooperative TU-game, which arises directly from the underlying normal form game by applying the standard maxmin-technique.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

(Average-) Convexity of Common Pool and Oligopoly Tu-Games

Driessen

Meinhardt

2001

Int. Game Theory Rev.

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The paper studies both the convexity and average-convexity properties for a particular class of cooperative TU-games called common pool games. The common pool situation involves a cost function as well as a (weakly decreasing) average joint production function. Firstly, it is shown that, if the relevant cost function is a linear function, then the common pool games are convex games. The convexity, however, fails whenever cost functions are arbitrary. We present sufficient conditions involving the cost functions (like weakly decreasing marginal costs as well as weakly decreasing average costs) and the average joint production function in order to guarantee the convexity of the common pool game. A similar approach is effective to investigate a relaxation of the convexity property known as the average-convexity property for a cooperative game. An example illustrates that oligopoly games are a special case of common pool games whenever the average joint production function represents an inverse demand function.

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“…In addition, Scholvin (2016) reveals in detail how asymmetry turned out to be an important aspect mostly in each known form of geopolitical relations. Furthermore, Meinhardt (2002) points out that the asymmetric strategy always presents in relationships. Arreguin-Toft (2001) suggests that all modern asymmetric conflicts can be understood when they are considered through the prism of the strategy and concludes that asymmetry is a strategy and strategy is an asymmetry.…”

Section: Background and Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Global Security and Economic Asymmetry: A Comparison of Developed and Developing Countries

Guliyeva¹,

Брітченко²,

Rzayeva³

2018

JSSI

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Abstract. This paper tackles the asymmetry of economic interests and geopolitics between developed and developing countries. Currently, the geopolitics presupposes that the majority of novel technologies are devised and designed in developed countries with their subsequent transfer to the developing countries. Moreover, in the context of the global crisis, the issue of de-dollarization is relevant from the political and economic points of view. Our specific focus is on the small oil countries and the issue how to get off the oil needle in the painless way. Furthermore, the paper analyzes the rise of cryptocurrency that is envisaged as the substitute of the U.S. dollar which has been the world most dominating currency for the last several decades. This paper considers the global asymmetry which has the greatest impact on countries with economies dependent on energy exports. In the light of the diminishing returns from the sale of oil, we examine the ways for escaping this asymmetry. The authors consider the geopolitical asymmetry stemming from the dominance of the U.S. dollar, analyze the political situation and offer the pathways for the development of those economies where oil become an obstacle for economic development. The paper examines the ways of solving the above-mentioned problem by other states in detail and conduct the comparative analysis of the above issues in relation to the economy of Azerbaijan. From this case study we conduct a comparative analysis of the developed and developing countries taking into account the economic asymmetry and global economic and financial security.

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Cooperative Decision Making in Common Pool Situations

Cited by 19 publications

References 0 publications

Non-binding agreements and fairness in commons dilemma games

Non-binding agreements and fairness in commons dilemma games

(Average-) Convexity of Common Pool and Oligopoly Tu-Games

Global Security and Economic Asymmetry: A Comparison of Developed and Developing Countries

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