Cooperation and competition in argumentative exchanges

Krabbe, Erik C. W.

doi:10.14195/978-989-26-0498-5_6

Cited by 6 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…350 B.C.E. 2014,(8.11, 161a17-24) By calling it necessary, Aristotle suggests that the parties can fulfil their dialectic goals by including such an eristic move (Krabbe 2009). But in which sense?…”

Section: Compensating For a Suboptimal Settingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Argumentation in Suboptimal Settings

Castro

2022

Argumentation

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When parties attempt to persuade their opponents of the tenability of a certain standpoint using reasons, they will often find that the circumstances of the dialogue hinder their chances of resolution. Power imbalances, cognitive biases, lack of time or hidden interests are some of the circumstances they need to face. I will label these circumstances as suboptimal settings for argumentation. According to the pragma-dialectical tradition, higher-order conditions for critical discussion are unfulfilled in these cases (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jacobs, & Jackson, 1993). The main question of this paper is the following: what is the normative standard that parties in a discussion need to follow to arrive at a resolution within such circumstances? I will defend a middle-ground solution between two extreme ones.The first extreme position, the anything-goes policy, claims that, given that the conditions for a reasonable exchange of reasons are not satisfied, the dialogue stands outside the domain of reason, so anything goes for the parties. The second extreme position, the business as usual policy, claims that, since critical discussion is a normative model, the same rules should apply in suboptimal settings. Finally, the supernormal policy that I defend claims that we need a more general and comprehensive norm that I refer to as a supernorm to evaluate these cases.The supernormal policy divides argumentation into two stages: preparation and resolution. In the preparation stage, the parties attempt to restore or compensate for the suboptimality of the setting, while in the resolution stage, they attempt to resolve their disagreement. I contend that the moves of the preparation stage should be evaluated by using the supernorm instead of by the rules for critical discussion (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004). At this point, the paper considers theoretical insights from Gilbert (1995, 1997, 2002) and Jacobs (2000, 2006) to understand what this entails.

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Section: Compensating For a Suboptimal Settingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Argumentation in Suboptimal Settings

Castro

2022

Argumentation

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“…3 By entering into a particular argumentative activity type, a person is implicitly committed to such an outcome of the opening stage. Krabbe (2009) holds that the normative model of critical discussion prescribes a high level of cooperation between the participants, while at the same time allowing the parties some level of competitiveness. Various dialogue types can be seen as forcing the participants to raise the level of cooperation beyond the level prescribed by a resolution-oriented critical discussion.…”

Section: Analysing and Evaluating Eristic Argumentationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In other words, additional procedural starting points can be established by the participants in the opening stage of their discussion. Thus, both Krabbe (2009) andvan Eemeren et al (2010) assign a direct evaluative role to the dialogue (or argumentative activity) type in allowing the procedural commitments of the participants to be partly determined by the argumentative activity type. Thus, when evaluating argumentative discourse we can determine whether the argumentation follows both the general rules of critical discussion and the additional or specified norms agreed upon in the opening stage.…”

Section: Analysing and Evaluating Eristic Argumentationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Argumentative Bluff in Eristic Discussion: An Analysis and Evaluation

Laar

2010

Argumentation

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How does the analysis and evaluation of argumentation depend on the dialogue type in which the argumentation has been put forward? This paper focuses on argumentative bluff in eristic discussion. Argumentation cannot be presented without conveying the pretence that it is dialectically reasonable, as well as, at least to some degree, rhetorically effective. Within eristic discussion it can be profitable to engage in bluff with respect to such claims. However, it will be argued that such bluffing is dialectically inadmissible, even within an eristic discussion.

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“…SeeKrabbe (2009) for a discussion of competition and argumentation from a pragma-dialectical perspective.…”

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Adversariality and Argumentation

Casey¹

2020

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The concept of adversariality, like that of argument, admits of significant variation. As a consequence, I argue, the question of adversarial argument has not been well understood. After defining adversariality, I argue that if we take argument to be about beliefs, rather than commitments, then two considerations show that adversariality is an essential part of it. First, beliefs are not under our direct voluntary control. Second, beliefs are costly both for the psychological states they provoke and for the fact that they are causally related to our actions. As a result, argument involving agreement can also be understood to be adversarial.

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Cooperation and competition in argumentative exchanges

Cited by 6 publications

References 1 publication

Argumentation in Suboptimal Settings

Argumentation in Suboptimal Settings

Argumentative Bluff in Eristic Discussion: An Analysis and Evaluation

Adversariality and Argumentation

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