Controlling Corruption

Klitgaard, Robert

doi:10.1525/9780520911185

Cited by 1,075 publications

(247 citation statements)

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“…On the other hand, the economic/rational choice theory of causes of corruption focuses on actions by agents intended to increase the agent’s self-aggrandizing interest, considering opportunity costs and information (Monroe, 1991). The rational choice approach is exemplified by the principal–agent model (Klitgaard, 1988; Rose-Ackerman, 1978), game theory (Geddes, 1991; Manion, 1996), and cost–benefit (Nye, 1967) analyses of corruption. The most popular rational choice approach example is Klitgaard’s (1988) principal–agent model.…”

Section: Understanding the History Of Corruption Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…The rational choice approach is exemplified by the principal–agent model (Klitgaard, 1988; Rose-Ackerman, 1978), game theory (Geddes, 1991; Manion, 1996), and cost–benefit (Nye, 1967) analyses of corruption. The most popular rational choice approach example is Klitgaard’s (1988) principal–agent model. It will be examined in more detail later in this section.…”

Section: Understanding the History Of Corruption Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is the most widely used approach to study corruption and it is also the approach most often used by policymakers designing anti-corruption policies. The principal–agent models view corruption as an informational problem when the principal fails to monitor the agent properly (Gurgur and Shah, 2005; Klitgaard, 1988; Marquette and Peiffer, 2015; Rose-Ackerman, 1978). For example, the people are considered the principal as they vote to elect a political representative, who in turn is considered to be the agent.…”

Section: Current Corruption Literature: Macro- and Micro-level Approamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The principal–agent approach is also considered too reductionist (Anderson and Gray, 2006), and agency models ignore the existence of broader institutional structures that could condition agent behavior. For example, Robert Klitgaard’s (1988: 75) classical conceptualization of corruption Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability omits important macro-level factors such as the types of political systems and societal attitudes.…”

Section: Current Corruption Literature: Macro- and Micro-level Approamentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Corruption research: A need for an integrated approach

Zimelis

2020

International Area Studies Review

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This article reviews the main corruption literature trends and theoretical foundations and points out the challenges of existing explanations of corruption. The emphasis on broad national-level variables limits our understanding of corruption and anti-corruption processes at the local level. Corruption studies also suffer from the bias of focusing on developing countries and nation-states. These shortcomings can be remedied by using an integrated approach to studying corruption in western countries and cities.

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Section: Understanding the History Of Corruption Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Understanding the History Of Corruption Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Current Corruption Literature: Macro- and Micro-level Approamentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Current Corruption Literature: Macro- and Micro-level Approamentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Corruption research: A need for an integrated approach

Zimelis

2020

International Area Studies Review

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“…The Bank and like-minded analysts seek to tackle corruption on two fronts, one structural and one normative. On the structural front, the reform agenda begins from Klitgaard's (1988) pithy observation that discretion plus monopoly minus accountability equals corruption. Reforms are thus targeted to reduce discretion of public officials through privatisation and deregulation, reduce monopoly by promoting political and economic competition, and increase accountability by supporting democratisation (for political accountability) and bureaucratisation (for administrative accountability).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The politics of anti-corruption reform in Africa

Lawson

2009

J. Mod. Afr. Stud.

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Previous research on anti-corruption reform in Africa falls into two camps. The first explores ‘best practices’ and policy approaches to controlling corruption, while the second focuses on the politics of anti-corruption ‘reform’, arguing that official anti-corruption campaigns aim to mollify donors while using corruption charges instrumentally to undermine rivals and shore up personal loyalty to the president, and thus have no chance of controlling corruption. This paper suggests that, while the neopatrimonial context is a very significant limiting factor in anti-corruption reform, limited progress is possible. Examining the motivations and effects, intended and unintended, of anti-corruption reforms in Kenya and Nigeria, it finds that while the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission has indeed been politically marginalised and largely ineffectual, the more autonomous and activist, but politically instrumentalised, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission in Nigeria has had a measure of success. The analysis suggests that this is explained by the EFCC's independent prosecutorial powers and the institutionalisation strategies of its chairman.

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The efficiency implications of corruption

Khan

1996

J. Int. Dev.

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Corruption has different efficiency effects across countries. Conventional economic models of corruption are shown to be deficient in explaining these differences. Instead the article suggests that the distribution of power within the patron-client networks in which corruption is taking place is an important variable explaining the differences in the efficiency effects of corruption. Where patrons are powerful the range of rights transacted is limited and the allocation is likely to be efficiency maximizing. In contrast where patrons are weak the range of rights transacted is likely to be much wider with the rights allocated according to political calculations with large efficiency costs.

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Controlling Corruption

Cited by 1,075 publications

References 0 publications

Corruption research: A need for an integrated approach

Corruption research: A need for an integrated approach

The politics of anti-corruption reform in Africa

The efficiency implications of corruption

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