Contract type and decision right of sales promotion in supply chain management with a capital constrained retailer

Jin, Yannan; Wang, Sujuan; Hu, Qiying

doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2014.07.030

Cited by 68 publications

(38 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…Jin et al. () study a supply chain that involves two contract types, that is, the wholesale price contract and consignment contract. Meanwhile, the decision right of sales promotion can be assigned to either the manufacturer or retailer.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Wholesale price contract versus consignment contract in a supply chain considering dynamic advertising

Zhang

2017

Int Trans Operational Res

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Supply chain contracts are widely considered as useful and necessary tools to guide and restrict channel members' behaviors. Considering the effect of dynamic advertising, we investigate two distinct types of contracts between a dominant retailer and her manufacturer. One contract is a traditional wholesale price contract and the other is a consignment contract. The results show that, compared to the wholesale price contract, the consignment contract is always more desirable from the perspectives of the retailer and the entire channel and brings more consumer surplus. When the dominant retailer's advertising effort is very effective or channel members have enough patience, the dominant retailer and the manufacturer can achieve a Pareto improvement under the consignment contract; otherwise the manufacturer prefers the wholesale price contract.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Similar to Jin et al. (), we also consider these two contract types; however, we mainly study the interaction of the channel members considering the dynamic advertising under the two contracts, and focus on their contract preferences instead of the decision right of sales promotion.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Wholesale price contract versus consignment contract in a supply chain considering dynamic advertising

Zhang

2017

Int Trans Operational Res

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“…Wang et al (2013) investigate a dominant retailer's optimal joint strategy of pricing and timing of effort investment and analyze how it influences the decision of the manufacturer, the total supply chain profit, and the consumers' payoff. Jin et al (2015) investigate the issue of sales-effort decision rights under a wholesale price contract. They found that it is better for both the manufacturer and the retailer if one firm fully controls the market demand (e.g., through pricing and sales effort) and the other firm moves first.…”

Section: A N U S C R I P Tmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing and sales-effort investment under bi-criteria in a supply chain of virtual products involving risk

Chernonog

Avinadav

Ben-Zvi

2015

European Journal of Operational Research

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“…Jin et al. () consider a combination of four cases to study the contract type and decision right of sales promotion in a supply chain with a capital‐constrained supply chain.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Tsao et al (2014) develop a retailer-Stackelberg model for optimizing category-level shelf-space management with trade allowance. Jin et al (2015) consider a combination of four cases to study the contract type and decision right of sales promotion in a supply chain with a capital-constrained supply chain.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Designing optimal and practical volume discounting contracts for the dominant retailer with information asymmetry

Wang

Tao

Wang

2015

Int Trans Operational Res

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With the increasing prevalence of huge international retail chains and the subcontracting of manufacturing to developing countries by owners of major international brands, the dominant‐retailer‐oriented incentive contracts become increasingly more relevant. The literature suggests that most of the contract formats known as channel‐coordinating for the dominant supplier become quite or totally ineffective when the retailer is the dominant player in the supply chain. A menu of contracts is shown to be theoretically most effective for the dominant retailer; however, it is too complex to be implemented in the real world. This paper first proves that the menu of contracts is actually a nonlinear volume discounting contract. Based on this characteristic, we propose two contract formats, namely, volume discounting on markup and volume discounting on slotting fee. Our results show that these two new proposed schemes perform substantially better than the currently most‐used contract formats (e.g., markup contract formats), and they can also be perceived as performing nearly as well as the menu of contracts.

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Contract type and decision right of sales promotion in supply chain management with a capital constrained retailer

Cited by 68 publications

References 18 publications

Wholesale price contract versus consignment contract in a supply chain considering dynamic advertising

Wholesale price contract versus consignment contract in a supply chain considering dynamic advertising

Pricing and sales-effort investment under bi-criteria in a supply chain of virtual products involving risk

Designing optimal and practical volume discounting contracts for the dominant retailer with information asymmetry

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