Contract-Theoretic Pricing for Security Deposits in Sharded Blockchain With Internet of Things (IoT)

Incentivizing Proof-of-Stake Blockchain for Secured Data Collection in UAV-Assisted IoT: A Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning Approach

“…In [24], the authors propose a UAV virtualization scheme with a partially decentralized blockchain model to secure industry IoT on a pay-per-use basis. In [25], the authors employ contract theory to balance the stakes and efforts in blockchain IoT towards the maximum profit while tackling the practical scenarios with hidden information and hidden action. In [26], the authors apply the consortium blockchain with delegated PoS consensus to achieve traceable and anonymous vehicular IoT.…”

“…which denote the lower equilibrium for the followers and upper equilibrium for the leader, respectively. Then the lower equilibrium in (24) indicates that no follower will unilaterally deviate from the equilibrium strategy given the leader's action, while the upper equilibrium in (25) implies that the equilibrium strategy at the leader is optimal on condition that the lower equilibrium is also achieved among the followers.…”

A Dynamic Service Trading in a DLT-Assisted Industrial IoT Marketplace

“…Due to the selfishness of the players in the market, they may try to hide information to obtain a higher payoff while interacting with others, this is termed a moral hazard. The works in [20], [21] used contract-theoretic pricing strategies to tackle the moral hazard between the IoT users and the blockchain.…”

“…Recalling that (N − 1) + 2µN e b ia = C b ′ (e b ia ) and 2e s ia = C s′ (e s ia ) then, (20) relates the revenue share ratio with the marking efforts of the supplier and the broker. ( 20) requires the supplier and the broker to choose their market efforts so that the ratio of the broker's marginal cost to the total of marginal cost is equal to the revenue sharing ratio.…”

“…where 20), we know that in the IA scenario, the supplier can only design the contract according to its own effort. Finally, we substitute the optimal effort of broker from (19) and the revenue sharing ratio (20) into the utility function of the supplier in (16a) to obtain the optimal value of the supplier's effort…”