Contract Auctions for Sponsored Search

Goel, Sharad; Lahaie, Sébastien; Vassilvitskii, Sergei

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-10841-9_19

Cited by 6 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 17 publications

(20 reference statements)

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“…This also illustrates the main differences from a paper using the QVA for sponsored search [9]. There, under the condition of consistent valuations, which is implied by our weakly transferable utility condition, it is also shown that the QVA is strategy-proof.…”

Section: Related Worksupporting

confidence: 52%

“…We believe that techniques that successfully address these issues could be effectively used in many real-world settings, ranging from the assignment of programming and development tasks in open-source projects, sponsored search [9], incentivizing privacy in e-commerce [4], to allocating an infrastructural project with a fixed budget to one of a number of competing construction companies.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A proposal by Goel et al [9] relies on a similar conception. The possibility of indifferences in the center's preferences, however, introduces a number of issues, especially with respect to strategy-proofness and Pareto optimality.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

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Strategy-proof contract auctions and the role of ties

Weerdt

Harrenstein

Conitzer

2014

Games and Economic Behavior

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A contract auction establishes a contract between a center and one of the bidders. As contracts may describe many terms, preferences over contracts typically display indifferences. The Qualitative Vickrey Auction (QVA) selects the best contract for the winner that is at least as good for the center as any of the contracts offered by the non-winning players. When each bidder can always offer a contract with higher utility for the center at an arbitrarily small loss of her own utility, the QVA is the only mechanism that is individually rational, strategy-proof, selects stable outcomes, and is Pareto-efficient. For general continuous utility functions, a variant of the QVA involving fixed tie-breaking is strategy-proof and also selects stable outcomes. However, there is no mechanism in this setting that in addition also selects Pareto-efficient outcomes.

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Section: Related Worksupporting

confidence: 52%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Strategy-proof contract auctions and the role of ties

Weerdt

Harrenstein

Conitzer

2014

Games and Economic Behavior

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“…In order to reduce the effects of divergence in valuations, Goel et al have introduced contract auctions, which generalize the classical second price auction [40]. In particular, they propose an impression-plus-click pricing mechanism, in which advertisers pay a fixed amount per impression plus an additional amount if their ad is clicked.…”

Section: Click-through-rate Estimationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sponsored search auctions: an overview of research with emphasis on game theoretic aspects

Maillé

Markakis

Naldi

et al. 2012

Electron Commer Res

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We provide an overview of recent research that has been conducted on the design of sponsored search auctions. We mainly focus on game theoretic and mechanism design aspects of these auctions, and we analyze the issues associated with each of the three participating entities, i.e. the search engine, the advertisers, and the users of the search engine, as well as their resulting behavior. Regarding the search engine, we overview the various mechanisms that have been proposed including the currently used GSP mechanism. The issues that are addressed include analysis of Nash equilibria and their performance, design of alternative mechanisms and aspects of competition among search engines. We then move on to the advertisers and discuss the problem of choosing a bidding strategy, given the mechanism of the search engine. Following this, we consider the end users and we examine how user behavior may create externalities and influence the performance of the advertisers. Finally, we also overview statistical methods for estimating modeling parameters that are of interest to the three entities. In each section, we point out interesting open problems and directions for future research.

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“…A hybrid mechanism similar to what we suggest has been defined and studied in [7,8], under the name impression plus click pricing: the equivalence result is not satisfied there because the beliefs about the CTR are considered potentially different between the publisher and the advertiser, hence the need for a richer mechanism. An interesting feature of the proposed auction scheme is that despite the relaxation of this common knowledge assumption, the mechanism is still incentive-compatible.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%