Content and Cause in the Aristotelian Mind

Abstract

De Anima's lead idea is that the soul is the form of the body.' Implicitly, its functions and states depend in some systematic way on functions and states of the body. So Aristotelian psychology is a department of physics. This works well enough for nutrition, locomotion, and perception. Unfortunately, as Aristotle is quick to confess, it is considerably less clear how theoretical thought, particularly, fits the lead idea. Lacking a dedicated organ, the mind (voDc,) cannot be the form of any determinate, localizable bunch of matter. So noetic2 functions will have to depend in some weaker way on the body. I have in mind the following, fairly basic, idea: SUP. A family Y of properties supervenes on a family @ of properties 5 necessarily, for any property r in Y, if x has y~, then there is a property cp in such that x has cp and, necessarily, whatever has cp has

Aristotle on how to define a psychological state

“…For some suggestions on how this works see Wedin 1989, 1993a, and 1994. 2 To follow Wedin, 1989, 1993a, and 1994 This paper is part of a larger investigation of the relation between so-called intentional level items and those lower-level items that are correlated with them. This includes the general relation between form and matter.…”

“…,s And pressed into service in Wedin, 1993a. ,9 This section borrows some material from Wedin, 1993a. That article addresses in considerably more detail a number of issues surrounding the topic of supervenience and Aristotle's use of it.…”

“…79-82 and note 78. 3, Some, for example, Caston, 1993, would argue that a kind of necessary equivalence is sufficient for reduction. On this see Wedin, 1993a. 32 However, Wardy finds even this unacceptable. However, his "Aristotle would definitely reject (b) (our [6b]) out of hand, since it entails that there is complete determination from below, that matter determines form rather than the other way about" (1990, p. 204) is doubly curious.…”

“…VII.3, it is by no means settled what variety of supervenience is involved. On both points, see Wedin, 1993a. 4~ There is, thus, a parallel between boiling of the blood and the body in general.…”

Keeping the Matter in Mind: Aristotle on the Passions and the Soul

“…This way of looking at (D) and (E) brings the case of anger much closer to the cases from Phys. VII.3, discussed in Wedin (1993a), where form is held to supervene on matter. And because that discussion entertained a version of supervenience that explicitly allows for multiple realizability,^^ we need to press further Aristotle's openness to the possibility that anger is compositionally plastic.…”