Aristotle on Belief and Knowledge

Miller, Fred D.

doi:10.1007/978-94-007-6004-2_16

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 19 publications

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“…Such awareness could render beliefs or believing a less reliable cognitive activity, one all too often troubled by deception and delusions. Since Aristotle, believing has been contrasted with knowing, based on strict epistemic methods; a rather second-class cognition, reserved for other areas where the ideal model was harder to attain ( Miller, 2013 ).…”

Section: How Important Are Beliefs For Society At Large and Its Susta...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Why does the multidisciplinary study of beliefs and believing matter so much?

Oviedo

2022

Front. Psychol.

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Section: How Important Are Beliefs For Society At Large and Its Susta...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Why does the multidisciplinary study of beliefs and believing matter so much?

Oviedo

2022

Front. Psychol.

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Truth inMetaphysics Ε4

Crivelli

2015

Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Volume 48

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Two chapters of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, E 4 and Θ 10, discuss truth and a use of the verb ‘to be’ associated with it. The relationship between these two chapters is problematic because despite an apparent cross-reference connecting them, they seem to put forward incompatible views. This chapter argues that (contrary to appearances and to what some commentators believe) E 4 fully agrees with Θ 10. One of the assumptions on which the reconciliation relies is that when ‘to be’ is employed in accordance with the use associated with truth, it applies to external things (mainly, but not exclusively, states of affairs) but neither to thoughts nor to sentences (to both of which however ‘true’ applies). This sheds a novel light on E 4, which turns out to make claims rather different from those which commentators have taken it to defend. In particular, E 4 commits Aristotle to the view that states of affairs (unlike Fregean thoughts) are mind-dependent entities.

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Processes of believing: Where do they come from? What are they good for?

Seitz

Paloutzian

Angel³

2017

F1000Res

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Despite the long scholarly discourse in Western theology and philosophy on religion, spirituality, and faith, explanations of what a belief and what believing is are still lacking. Recently, cognitive neuroscience research addressed the human capacity of believing. We present evidence suggesting that believing is a human brain function which results in probabilistic representations with attributes of personal meaning and value and thereby guides individuals' behavior. We propose that the same mental processes operating on narratives and rituals constitute belief systems in individuals and social groups. Our theoretical model of believing is suited to account for secular and non-secular belief formation. SummaryAlthough largely neglected in contemporary science, we will show that believing is a fundamental brain function on which individual and societal behavior is grounded.

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Aristotle on Belief and Knowledge

Cited by 4 publications

References 19 publications

Why does the multidisciplinary study of beliefs and believing matter so much?

Why does the multidisciplinary study of beliefs and believing matter so much?

Truth inMetaphysics Ε4

Processes of believing: Where do they come from? What are they good for?

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