Consumers as VAT "Evaders": Incidence, Social Bias, and Correlates in Colombia

The Fiscal Cost of Conflict: Evidence from La Violencia in Colombia

“…Besley and Persson (2008) support these mechanisms through a theoretical model in which the probability of internal conflict reduces the incentives to invest in revenue-raising institutions. Moreover, available empirical evidence for Colombia confirm these findings, showing that the incidence of violence is related to lower enforcement of the tax regime by the government (i.e., low investment in cadastre) and reduced willingness of the population to comply with tax obligations (Fergusson, Molina, & Riaño, 2019;Ch, Shapiro, Steele, & Vargas, 2018;Cardenas, Eslava, & Ramirez, 2016).…”

“…Besley and Persson (2008) shed light on these mechanisms through a theoretical model in which the probability of internal conflict reduces the incentives to invest in revenue-raising institutions. This last hypothesis, although not quantitatively proven for La Violencia, has been supported by historical works of this period (Guzmán et al, 1962), as well as by the literature of recent internal conflict in Colombia (Ch et al, 2018;Cardenas et al, 2016;Fergusson et al, 2019).…”

“…These results are consistent with previous evidence indicating an effect of internal conflict on tax collection efficiency. Cardenas et al (2016) and Fergusson et al (2019) find that conflict affects collection efficiency by promoting a negative reciprocity of tax-payers towards a state that fails to guarantee their security and protect their private property. Also, Ch et al (2018) argue that violence deters fiscal capacity as it enables groups with de facto power to build fiscal institutions consistent with their preferences.…”

Who wants violence? The political economy of conflict and state building in Colombia

“…But prominent political leaders (including Santos' own former vice-president) opposed, arguing that there would be a witch-hunt against innocent victims of paramilitary extortion. 21 The concerns may be legitimate, or may (more realistically, perhaps) also reflect a fear of losing a historically privileged treatment that elites enjoy in the status quo I described in this essay. Finally, security challenges abound.…”

“…See "¿Extorsión legislativa? : Las razones del escaso quórum para la paz Política", in El Espectador, November 4 of 2017, Available at https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/extorsion -legislativa-las-razones-del-escaso-quorum-para-la-paz-articulo-721548 21. This article was originally written before the transition to a new government, headed by the political group leading the opposition to the agreement with the FARC.…”