Consumer Demand for Vehicle Safety: An Empirical Study

Abstract

Although numerous studies on the effects of vehicle safety regulation exist, few are devoted to consumer demands for vehicle safety. This study uses an extensive data set combining vehicle specific information wirh responsesfrom a national household survey of new car buyers to estimate individual demand for safety. It finds, ceteris paribus, purchase probability rises with an increase in safety features. In particular, an index of vehicle crashworthinessis a strong determinant of purchase decisions. The results favor a policy of posting crash test results and suggest that passive restraint systems enhance the likelihood of purchasing a given model.

The demand for corporate jets: a discrete choice analysis

“…The use of 15 choices is in keeping with the literature (e.g. Train, 1986;McCarthy, 1990 Elasticities are based on Table 1 coefficients and assume that the purchaser is a firm with revenues of $1 billion and no brand loyalties.…”

“…For example, many firm-specific attributes are invariant across the choice set and, therefore, fall out. 'For example, McCarthy (1990) and Mannering and Mahmassani (1985) in their automobile demand studies divided price by household income. An alternative is to enter price separately and add an interaction variable with income (revenue).…”

“…At the same time, jet billings reached an all time high of $1.2 billion, again primarily on the strength of large business jet sales. Various reasons have been offered for the dramatic cyclical 'Examples include McCarthy (1990), Train (1986), Mannering and Mahmassani (1985), Mannering and Winston (1985), Manski and Sherman (1980) and Lave and Train (1979). ' An exception is advertising as a potential source of information.…”

Economics and urban transportation policy in the United States

“…It as apparent from the table that these accident costs, while substanttal, are not so large as to overwhelm the other costs that people votuntanly bear when driving automobiles For example, they are only 21 percent as large as the first four categories shown m the table, which exclude parking or motor-vehicle taxes. Therefore, we m:ght expect that ff drivers were faced more dtrectly with these accident costs than they are now, they rmght take greater measures to reduce acc:dents, but these measures would not mchide drastic curtmlment of automobile use Recent marketing trends m the automobile industry confirm that customers are wxllmg to put up substanual sums to :mprove safety, for exampIe by paying for antflock brakes, an" bags, and other safety features (McCarthy~ 1990, Calfee and Winston, 1993. Mamaenng and Winston, 1995 If this ~s so, what justtficatmn ~s there for any government intervention?…”

Product Safety Regulation

“…Also few studies devoted to investigate the issue of consumer demand for vehicle safety might turn out to be useful for drawing valuable normative conclusions for policymakers. An example is the writing of McCarthy (1990), who uses extensive data set to focus the attention on the individual's demand for safety. He argues for the desirability of a policy, which mandates car dealers to make public crash test results.…”