Constitutive Rules, Language, and Ontology

Hindriks, Frank

doi:10.1007/s10670-009-9178-6

Cited by 94 publications

(57 citation statements)

References 29 publications

(17 reference statements)

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“…The crucial element is that there is a constitutive concept from which there is a normative logic regarding how markets are made or acknowledged and what operative/consequential rules apply to their functioning. Further reading see [56]. )…”

Section: Institutional Environments As Legal Institutions (Sui Generis)mentioning

confidence: 98%

Normative Alignment, Institutional Resilience and Shifts in Legal Governance of the Energy Transition

Heldeweg

2017

Sustainability

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Abstract:In Europe, the energy transition by means of a governance shift through liberalization is followed by a transition and shift towards community energy initiatives, with a particular view of supporting the demand for greater energy sustainability. What institutional legal consequences, as constraints and opportunities for lawful behaviour, follow from a shift in legal governance towards facilitating resilient community energy services? This conceptual article looks for an answer to this question by combining governance theory with Ostrom's IAD-framework and Institutional Legal Theory. A key aspect is understanding normative alignment (as institutional conduciveness and resilience) in relation to the possible shift from the current institutional environment of regulated energy market to that of a community energy network. The heuristic and analytical (design) relevance of the approach is illustrated with two policy examples contrasting the energy democratization and energy expansion frames, and discussed also in the perspective of energy governance experimentation with community energy initiatives in The Netherlands. Three scenarios of shifts in legal governance are identified. The key issue in legal governance design is the choice between these, particularly with respect to the integrity of institutional environments in terms of former frames to provide proper guidance to operational (experimental) activity.

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Section: Institutional Environments As Legal Institutions (Sui Generis)mentioning

confidence: 98%

Normative Alignment, Institutional Resilience and Shifts in Legal Governance of the Energy Transition

Heldeweg

2017

Sustainability

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“…* ' is what we call (following Hindriks 2005Hindriks , 2009) the transformation view of constitutive rules.…”

Section: Another Way To Put It Is That We Have Transformed the Regulamentioning

confidence: 99%

Institutions, rules, and equilibria: a unified theory

Hindriks

Guala

2014

Journal of Institutional Economics

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132

105

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Abstract. We propose a new framework to unify three conceptions of institutions that play a prominent role in the philosophical and scientific literature: the equilibria account, the regulative rules account, and the constitutive rules account. We argue that equilibrium-based and rule-based accounts are individually inadequate, but that jointly they provide a satisfactory conception of institutions as rules-in-equilibrium. In the second part of the paper we show that constitutive rules can be derived from regulative rules via the introduction of theoretical terms. We argue that the constitutive rules theory is reducible to the rules-in equilibrium theory, and that it accounts for the way in which we assign names to social institutions.

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“…In another respect, however, it is too simple. As I have argued elsewhere, Searle's social ontology is incomplete: the notion of a constitutive rule needs to be complemented with that of a status rule (Hindriks 2009;2012). As I conceive of them, status rules concern the enabling and constraining roles of institutions, their practical significance.…”

Section: Status Rulesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Collective Acceptance and the Is-Ought Argument

Hindriks

2012

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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According to John Searle's well-known Is-Ought Argument, it is possible to derive an ought-statement from is-statements only. This argument concerns obligations involved in institutions such as promising, and it relies on the idea that institutions can be conceptualized in terms of constitutive rules. In this paper, I argue that the structure of this argument has never been fully appreciated. Starting from my status account of constitutive rules, I reconstruct the argument and establish that it is valid. This reconstruction reveals that the soundness of the argument depends on whether collective acceptance as such can generate obligations. Margaret Gilbert has argued that it can, and thus far some of her central arguments have not been addressed. The upshot is that the Is-Ought Argument deserves to be taken seriously once again.

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Constitutive Rules, Language, and Ontology

Abstract: It is a commonplace within philosophy that the ontology of institutions can be captured in terms of constitutive rules.

Cited by 94 publications

References 29 publications

Normative Alignment, Institutional Resilience and Shifts in Legal Governance of the Energy Transition

Normative Alignment, Institutional Resilience and Shifts in Legal Governance of the Energy Transition

Institutions, rules, and equilibria: a unified theory

Collective Acceptance and the Is-Ought Argument

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