Collective Acceptance and the Is-Ought Argument

Hindriks, Frank

doi:10.1007/s10677-012-9353-8

Cited by 13 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 22 publications

(5 reference statements)

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“…Th e key point is that the principle of fi delity entails a moral obligation if certain empirical conditions are satisfi ed including in particular the instantiation of certain attitudes. Th is moral conception of institutional normativity diff ers from the joint commitment conception in that the ultimate basis for institutional obligations is a moral principle rather than a set of attitudes per se (see Hindriks 2013).…”

Section: Institutions As Normsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Collective acceptance is required in order for those entities to perform them. It is not very clear what Searle takes a status function to be (see Hindriks 2013). It seems to mean nothing more than that having a status enables people to perform certain actions, or to use the relevant entity for designated purposes (which involve deontic powers).…”

Section: Social Constructionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Institutions and Collective Intentionality

Hindriks

2017

The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality

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Institutions shape many of the things people do. Th ink of waiting in line in a store, giving way to a car coming from the right (or left , depending on where you are), ordering a meal in a restaurant, buying a house, getting married, chairing a meeting, and running a multi-billion corporation. Th ere are two perspectives on what examples such as these have in common in both philosophy and the social sciences. According to the fi rst, each is an instance of a particular kind of behavioral regularity or recurring activity. According to the second, each is an instance of a certain kind of rule-based behavior. Th ese two perspectives are sometimes combined (Aoki 2011;Greif and Kingston 2011;Hindriks and Guala 2015). In this vein, Raimo Tuomela (2013) argues that institutions are normgoverned social practices. As social practices are recurring activities and as norms are rules, this defi nition-on which I will rely in this chapter-captures both perspectives.Institutional actions are caused by intentional attitudes. Oft en those attitudes are taken to be individual beliefs and desires-or, in the language of rational choice theory, expectations and preferences. I might, for instance, have a preference to drive on the right hand side of the road given that everybody else drives on this side. My decision to drive on this side of the road, on this type of analysis, is based in part on what I take your beliefs and desires to be, as well as on mutual beliefs about such attitudes. Your attitudes feature as parameters in my decision process and vice versa. In light of each other's attitudes, we mutually adjust our behavior to each other. Th is form of interdependence is commonly referred to as "strategic interaction. "Alternatively, institutional actions might involve a stronger form of interdependence in that they are based on collective attitudes instead. Collective intentional states involve a "we" as their subject instead of merely two or more I's. As a consequence, a collective attitude such as a belief or intention will be conceived of as "our" attitude, our belief or intention. Parties to a collective attitude take each other's agency more seriously than agents whose attitudes are regarded merely as parameters in strategic interaction. As I discuss in Section 1, diff erent theories of collective intentionality spell this out in diff erent terms.

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Section: Institutions As Normsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Social Constructionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Institutions and Collective Intentionality

Hindriks

2017

The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality

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“…The two claims that Searle intends to capture with the notion of a double direction of fit are these: institutional statuses require collective acceptance, and collective acceptance suffices for such statuses to exist. I have referred to the combination of these two claims as "the Collective Acceptance Principle" (Hindriks 2013a). This principle captures the (alleged) double direction of fit of collective acceptance.…”

Section: Against Status Functions and Status Function Declarationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Deconstructing Searle’s Making the Social World

Hindriks

2015

Philosophy of the Social Sciences

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Hindriks argued that Searle's theory of institutions suffers from a number of problems pertaining to the notions of constitutive rule, status function, Status Function Declaration, deontic power, and human right. Lobo argues that these criticisms are not sufficiently charitable. In response, it is argued here that the problems that were identified earlier are sufficiently severe to call for substantial revisions of the theory.

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“…10 10 It is not urgent for my aims to explain how collective intentionality generate obligations. See Frank Hindriks (2013) for an explanation based on Margaret Gilbert’s (1989, 2009) account of shared intention and joint commitment. …”

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confidence: 99%

A social ontology of “maximal” persons

Oyowe

2021

J Theory Soc Behav

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In this paper, I address a range of arguments put forward by Kwame Gyekye (1992) and Bernard Matolino (2014) denying Menkiti’s twin propositions that persons differ ontologically from human beings and that human attitudes, behaviours and practices constitute persons in social reality. They argue that his account of “maximal” persons, rooted in African traditional thought‐worlds, conflates issues and ultimately involve him in a category mistake. I argue that their arguments do not succeed, and that Menkiti’s view is not in any predicament because of them. Then, I draw on John Searle’s account of social ontology to clarify the sense in which attitudes, behaviours and practices are constituents of persons. Thus, I characterise persons as social entities belonging in a social ontology. Finally, I argue that realism regarding persons is not undermined by the threat of conventionalism lurking behind the view.

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Collective Acceptance and the Is-Ought Argument

Cited by 13 publications

References 22 publications

Institutions and Collective Intentionality

Institutions and Collective Intentionality

Deconstructing Searle’s Making the Social World

A social ontology of “maximal” persons

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