Constitutional Faith

Abstract

This book examines the “constitutional faith” that has, since 1788, been a central component of American “civil religion.” By taking seriously the parallel between wholehearted acceptance of the Constitution and religious faith, the book opens up a host of intriguing questions about what it means to be American. While some view the Constitution as the central component of an American religion that serves to unite the social order, the book maintains that its sacred role can result in conflict, fragmentation, and even war. This book takes the view that the Constitution’s value lies in the realm of the discourse it sustains: a uniquely American form of political rhetoric that allows citizens to grapple with every important public issue imaginable. A new afterword looks at the deepening of constitutional worship and attributes the current widespread frustrations with the government to the static nature of the Constitution.

Choice, emergence, and constitutional process: a framework for positive analysis

“…In two instances, Congress itself, without doubt carried by a strong sentiment of urgency, passed a hitherto unconstitutional bill, effectively bypassing the court. Before his presidency Lincoln stated: ‘If I were in Congress, and a vote could come up on the question whether slavery should be prohibited in a new territory, in spite of that Dred Scott decision [which held such prohibition unconstitutional], I would vote that it should’ (Lincoln cited in Levinson, 1988: 39). The courts, consequently, did not act when Lincoln became president despite their documented opposition (see Levinson, 1988: 39).…”

“…Before his presidency Lincoln stated: ‘If I were in Congress, and a vote could come up on the question whether slavery should be prohibited in a new territory, in spite of that Dred Scott decision [which held such prohibition unconstitutional], I would vote that it should’ (Lincoln cited in Levinson, 1988: 39). The courts, consequently, did not act when Lincoln became president despite their documented opposition (see Levinson, 1988: 39). Similarly, in 1937 Roosevelt bypassed the court's interpretation of the constitution when he said that the United Stated ‘reached the point as a Nation where we must take action to save the Constitution from the [Supreme Court]’ (Levinson, 1988: 41).…”

“…The courts, consequently, did not act when Lincoln became president despite their documented opposition (see Levinson, 1988: 39). Similarly, in 1937 Roosevelt bypassed the court's interpretation of the constitution when he said that the United Stated ‘reached the point as a Nation where we must take action to save the Constitution from the [Supreme Court]’ (Levinson, 1988: 41). These two examples illustrate that if a tacit constitution, which emerges from moral sentiments held within a society, stands in too stark an opposition to desires that acquire rational expression through political processes, the resulting gap is sometimes closed by effectively changing the constitution through interpretation.…”

Konstitucionalizacija patriotizma

“…52 Najrječitiju potvrdu te tvrdnje predstavlja "proces juridifikacije" u kojemu posebno mjesto, ulogu i značaj imaju Vrhovni sud SAD-a, 53 Savezni…”

Il referendum costituzionale e la saga delle riforme istituzionali in Italia: Much ado about nothing

“…Con il netto rifiuto di aggiornare la forma di governo, l'esito del referendum costituzionale del 4 dicembre 2016 ha convalidato l'assetto istituzionale italiano originario, con il suo parlamentarismo non razionalizzato e il suo bicameralismo ridondante, consolidando l'identità costituzionale italiana come un attaccamento forte tanto alla solida prima parte, la dignified constitution, quanto alla sua fragile e debole seconda parte, la (in)efficient constitution. Il patriottismo costituzionale italiano contemporaneo somiglia così alla constitutional faith statunitense (Levinson, 1988): una fede radicata nei valori originari ed una fedeltà alle generazioni passate, polemicamente opposte ai tentativi di riforma di assetti istituzionali disfunzionali, proposti dai politici viventi, verso cui fortissima è la sfiducia e di cui è debolissima la legittimazione sociale.…”