2010
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-010-0447-8
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Consistency in one-sided assignment problems

Abstract: One-sided assignment problems combine important features of two wellknown matching models. First, as in roommate problems, any two agents can be matched and second, as in two-sided assignment problems, the division of payoffs to agents is flexible as part of the solution. We take a similar approach to one-sided assignment problems as Sasaki (Int J Game Theory 24:373-397, 1995) for two-sided assignment problems, and we analyze various desirable properties of solutions including consistency and weak pairwise-mon… Show more

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Cited by 11 publications
(5 citation statements)
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“…Chung (2000) shows that when the division of surplus obeys an exogenous rule, odd rings are ruled out and the roommate problem has a stable matching; but that is clearly not an appealing assumption. Karlander and Eriksson (2001) provide a graphtheoretic characterization of stable outcomes when they exist; and Klaus and Nichifor (2010) studies their properties. Talman and Yang (2011) give a characterization in terms of integer programming.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Chung (2000) shows that when the division of surplus obeys an exogenous rule, odd rings are ruled out and the roommate problem has a stable matching; but that is clearly not an appealing assumption. Karlander and Eriksson (2001) provide a graphtheoretic characterization of stable outcomes when they exist; and Klaus and Nichifor (2010) studies their properties. Talman and Yang (2011) give a characterization in terms of integer programming.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…3 Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of the core using linear programming are obtained by Talman and Yang (2011). Eriksson and Karlander (2000) use graph theory to characterize the core, and Klaus and Nichifor (2010) provide some properties of this set when it is not empty. Chiappori et al (2014) show that stable matchings exist when the economy is replicated an even number of times by "cloning" each individual.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Klaus and Nichifor (2010) provide some results on the one-sided assignment game. For instance, they show that, for the subset of games where the core is non-empty if a subsolution of the core satisfies consistency and Pareto indifference, it coincides with the core.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Toda [20] propose an axiomatic characterization for the core of assignment games. Klaus and Nichifor [8] investigate the relation of the core with other allocation concepts for matching games. Recently, Vazirani [21] studies the approximate core and achieve the best possible approximation factor.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%