No abstract

RATIONAL HOUSEHOLD LABOR SUPPLY BY PIERRE-ANDRE CHIAPPORI' Traditionally, household behavior is derived from the maximization of a unique utility function. In this paper, we propose an alternative approach, in which the household is modeled as a two-member collectivity taking Pareto-efficient decisions. The consequences of this assumption are analyzed in a three-good model, in which only total consumption and each member's labor supply are observable. If the agents are assumed egoistic (i.e., they are only concerned with their own leisure and consumption), it is possible to derive falsifiable conditions upon household labor supplies from both a parametric and nonparametric viewpoint. If, alternatively, agents are altruistic, restrictions obtain in the nonparametric context; useful interpretation stems from the comparison with the characterization of aggregate demand for a private-good economy.

No abstract

Ce document est publié dans l'intention de rendre accessibles les résultats préliminaires de la recherche effectuée au CIRANO, afin de susciter des échanges et des suggestions. Les idées et les opinions émises sont sous l'unique responsabilité des auteurs, et ne représentent pas nécessairement les positions du CIRANO ou de ses partenaires. This paper presents preliminary research carried out at CIRANO and aims at encouraging discussion and comment. The observations and viewpoints expressed are the sole responsibility of the authors. They do not necessarily represent positions of CIRANO or its partners.

There is evidence from several sources that one cannot treat manyperson households as a single decision maker. If this is the case, then factors such as the relative incomes of the household members may affect the final allocation decisions made by the household. We develop a method of identifying how "incomes affect outcomes" given conventional family expenditure data. The basic assumption we make is that household decision processes lead to efficient outcomes. We apply our method to a sample of Canadian couples with no children. We find that the final allocations of expenditures on each partner depend significantly on their relative incomes and ages and on the level of lifetime wealth. We thank a referee, Gary Becker, Dwayne Benjamin, James Heckman, Thierry Magnac, Yoram Weiss, Robert Willis, and participants at conferences and seminars for their comments. This research was supported in part by the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council.