Conservative Reductionism

Esfeld, Michael; Sachse, Christian

doi:10.4324/9780203817346

Cited by 49 publications

(9 citation statements)

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“…In other words, the GRW equation is a candidate for a fundamental law of nature that is not time-reversal invariant. (Esfeld and Sachs [16], p. 60) Craig Callender [9] holds the same view as well. He puts it as following:…”

Section: A Few Lines Belowmentioning

confidence: 76%

Spontaneous Collapse Theories and Temporal Primitivism about Time’s Direction

López

2022

Found Phys

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Two views on the direction of time can be distinguished—primitivism and non-primitivism. According to the former, time’s direction is an in-built, fundamental property of the physical world. According to the latter, time’s direction is a derivative property of a fundamentally directionless reality. In the literature, non-primitivism has been widely supported since most (if not all) our fundamental dynamical laws are time-reversal invariant. In this paper, I offer a way out to the primitivist. I argue that we do have good grounds to support a primitive direction of time in the quantum realm. The rationale depends on exploiting the metaphysical and dynamical underdetermination of quantum theories to make a case in favor of primitivism. In particular, primitivism can be grounded in spontaneous collapse theories (e.g., GRW and CSL). The specific sense in which these theories capture a primitive direction of time is that, when the ontology of the theory is seriously taken into account, it does not remain invariant under time reversal. In taking GRW with a matter-density field (GRWm), I will argue that primitivism about the direction of time can be defended in the quantum case.

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Section: A Few Lines Belowmentioning

confidence: 76%

Spontaneous Collapse Theories and Temporal Primitivism about Time’s Direction

López

2022

Found Phys

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“…There is also a more metaphysical benefit to endorsing MVA as a general treatment of powers. In perhaps the only contemporary defence of a form of dispositionalism consistent with Megarian Actualism (though this is not mentioned by the authors) Esfeld and Sasche (2011) argue that unless powers manifest 'spontaneously', by which they mean always and independently of a stimulus, then their nature can be hidden in some worlds. There could then be a possible world in which the triggering [i.e.…”

Section: Megarian Variable Actualismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…They are, therefore, individuated by 'quiddities' (a 'such-ness' for properties equivalent to haecceities' 'this-ness' for particulars). In motivating their alternative powers ontology, Kistler (2002), Mumford (2004), Bird (2007), Esfeld and Sasche (2011) have pointed out that if only quiddities individuate two properties F and G then there can be two qualitatively identical worlds w 1 and w 2 distinguished only by the fact that the causal role F and G have in w 1 is swapped over in w 2 . Moreover, the quiddistically individuated properties seem compatible with a world w 3 in which F and G have an identical causal role.…”

Section: Megarian Variable Actualismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Megarian Variable Actualism

Friend

2021

Synthese

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Megarian Actualism is the denial of unmanifesting powers. Aristotle called such a view ‘buffoonery’ and dispositionalists have provided compelling reasons for the contrary platitude that powers need not manifest. Even so, drawing on extant treatments of quantitative powers I’ll suggest that many of the powers which feature in quantitative lawlike equations are plausibly interpreted as Megarian. This is because the powers described by such equations are best understood as being directed towards all the values of exhaustive manifestation variables. I’ll discuss the prospects for generalising these Megarian characteristics to powers not typically represented in strict quantitative terms. The result will be a strong basis for a scientifically informed and plausible dispositionalist account: Megarian Variable Actualism.

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“…In order to keep our discussion as focused as possible, I shall focus on the syndromal character of the approach, which raises two main concerns. First, it seems to be a general desideratum of scientific activity and explanation to focus on causal explanations (Esfeld & Sachse, 2011), amongst other reasons because, as nicely put forward by Woodward, causal relations are these relations that are exploitable for purpose of manipulation and control (Woodward, 2003). Obviously, defining mental disorders as clusters of symptoms does not, per se, prevents the development of various types of causal accounts with regards to the symptoms production, evolution or responses to treatment.…”

Section: Criterion Ementioning

confidence: 99%

What Are Mental Disorders?

Garson

2019

What Biological Functions Are and Why They Matter

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Mental disorders are currently defined in the official classification systems (DSM-5 and ICD-10) as syndromes consisting in clusters of symptoms combined with various exclusions conditions. However, these systems also assume that the symptoms occurs because of some underlying causes, which explain as why we regularly encounter in the population some specific clusters of symptoms rather than random distribution of symptoms. This paper aims at investigating the ontological status of mental disorders, reviewing the ontological commitments of various theoretical accounts defining mental disorders. It argues that, especially given the current state of the art in empirical research, mental disorders should be conceived as theoretical entities.

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Conservative Reductionism

Cited by 49 publications

References 0 publications

Spontaneous Collapse Theories and Temporal Primitivism about Time’s Direction

Spontaneous Collapse Theories and Temporal Primitivism about Time’s Direction

Megarian Variable Actualism

What Are Mental Disorders?

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