Consciousness: Matter or EMF?

McFadden, Johnjoe

doi:10.3389/fnhum.2022.1024934

Cited by 15 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 89 publications

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“…EM-field ToCs regularly reference the ease with which they defeat the binding problem, typically noting that fields are ontologically unified by their physical nature and automatically integrate all the information contained in the underlying EM activity that generates them (Jones, 2016;Keppler, 2021;Ward and Guevara, 2022;McFadden, 2023;etc.). However, the discussion of boundary problem issues is typically more implicit and does not account for all the concerns raised or implied by Rosenberg.…”

Section: Further Em-field Theory Perspectives On the Boundary Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Don’t forget the boundary problem! How EM field topology can address the overlooked cousin to the binding problem for consciousness

Gómez-Emilsson

Percy

2023

Front. Hum. Neurosci.

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The boundary problem is related to the binding problem, part of a family of puzzles and phenomenal experiences that theories of consciousness (ToC) must either explain or eliminate. By comparison with the phenomenal binding problem, the boundary problem has received very little scholarly attention since first framed in detail by Rosengard in 1998, despite discussion by Chalmers in his widely cited 2016 work on the combination problem. However, any ToC that addresses the binding problem must also address the boundary problem. The binding problem asks how a unified first person perspective (1PP) can bind experiences across multiple physically distinct activities, whether billions of individual neurons firing or some other underlying phenomenon. To a first approximation, the boundary problem asks why we experience hard boundaries around those unified 1PPs and why the boundaries operate at their apparent spatiotemporal scale. We review recent discussion of the boundary problem, identifying several promising avenues but none that yet address all aspects of the problem. We set out five specific boundary problems to aid precision in future efforts. We also examine electromagnetic (EM) field theories in detail, given their previous success with the binding problem, and introduce a feature with the necessary characteristics to address the boundary problem at a conceptual level. Topological segmentation can, in principle, create exactly the hard boundaries desired, enclosing holistic, frame-invariant units capable of effecting downward causality. The conclusion outlines a programme for testing this concept, describing how it might also differentiate between competing EM ToCs.

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Section: Further Em-field Theory Perspectives On the Boundary Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Don’t forget the boundary problem! How EM field topology can address the overlooked cousin to the binding problem for consciousness

Gómez-Emilsson

Percy

2023

Front. Hum. Neurosci.

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“…Penrose speculated that the problems posed by Libet's experiments might be explained by time divergence implicit in the spacetime superposition of mass prior to reduction, (Penrose, 2021). (McFadden, 2000(McFadden, , 2002(McFadden, , 2013(McFadden, , 2020(McFadden, , 2023. In CEMI, the EM field can push and pull neurons toward or away from firing to achieve the desired motor actions.…”

Section: Electromagnetic (Em) Field Theoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…CEMI fields are postulated to be causally active on the neurons that support them. The claim is that CEMI fields differ from non-conscious EM fields by their ability to “ generate (rather than merely transmit) thoughts as gestalt (integrated) information ” ( McFadden, 2000 , 2002 , 2013 , 2020 , 2023 ). In CEMI, the EM field can push and pull neurons toward or away from firing to achieve the desired motor actions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Simultaneity of consciousness with physical reality: the key that unlocks the mind-matter problem

Sanfey

2023

Front. Psychol.

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The problem of explaining the relationship between subjective experience and physical reality remains difficult and unresolved. In most explanations, consciousness is epiphenomenal, without causal power. The most notable exception is Integrated Information Theory (IIT), which provides a causal explanation for consciousness. However, IIT relies on an identity between subjectivity and a particular type of physical structure, namely with an information structure that has intrinsic causal power greater than the sum of its parts. Any theory that relies on a psycho-phyiscal identity must eventually appeal to panpsychism, which undermines that theory’s claim to be fundamental. IIT has recently pivoted towards a strong version of causal emergence, but macroscopic structures cannot be stronger causally than their microphysical parts without some new physical law or governing principle. The approach taken here is designed to uncover such a principle. The decisive argument is entirely deductive from initial premises that are phenomenologically certain. If correct, the arguments prove that conscious experience is sufficient to create additional degrees of causal freedom independently of the content of experience, and in a manner that is unpredictable and unobservable by any temporally sequential means. This provides a fundamental principle about consciousness, and a conceptual bridge between it and the physics describing what is experienced. The principle makes testable predictions about brain function, with notable differences from IIT, some of which are also empirically testable.

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“…Recently, a number of theories have proliferated attempting to explain phenomenal experience and qualia based on the activity of electromagnetic field ( Jones and Hunt, 2023 ). Field theories have arguably made real progress in explaining how fields integrate colors to form unified pictorial images ( McFadden, 2020 , 2023 ; Ward and Guevara, 2022 ). Theories of consciousness rooted in quantum physics are also well known ( Hameroff and Penrose, 2014 ; Tuszynski, 2020 ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Approaching the nature of consciousness through a phenomenal analysis of early vision. What is the explanandum?

Forti

2024

Front. Psychol.

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Loorits (2014) identifies the solution to the hard problem of consciousness in the possibility of fully analyzing seemingly non-structural aspects of consciousness in structural terms. However, research on consciousness conducted in recent decades has failed to bridge the explanatory gap between the brain and conscious mind. One reason why the explanatory gap cannot be filled, and consequently the problem remains hard, is that experience and neural structure are too different or “distant” to be directly compatible. Conversely, structural aspects of consciousness can be found in phenomenal experience. One possible alternative, therefore, is to seek the structure of seemingly non-structural aspects of consciousness not in the neural substrate, but within consciousness itself, through a phenomenal analysis of the qualitative aspects of experience, starting from its simplest forms. An essential premise is to reformulate the explanandum of consciousness, which is usually attributed to qualia and what it is like to be in a certain state. However, these properties do not allow us to identify the fundamental aspects of phenomenal experience. Sensations such as the redness of red or the painfulness of pain are inseparable from the context of the experience to which they belong, making qualia appear as phenomenal artifacts. Furthermore, the simplest qualitative aspects can be found in early vision. They are involved in perceptual organization and necessarily have relational significance. The unitary set of qualities found in early vision—such as those related to being an object, background or detail—constitutes the explanandum of the simplest forms of consciousness and seems to imply a justifying structure. Although early vision is characterized by interdependent qualitative components that form a unitary whole, we cannot find in it the structure of seemingly non-structural aspects of consciousness. Phenomenal appearance alone does not seem sufficient to identify a unitary structure of consciousness. However, the closeness of these characteristics to a unitary structure prompts us to delve into less explored territory, using the components of experience also as possible explanans.

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Consciousness: Matter or EMF?

Cited by 15 publications

References 89 publications

Don’t forget the boundary problem! How EM field topology can address the overlooked cousin to the binding problem for consciousness

Don’t forget the boundary problem! How EM field topology can address the overlooked cousin to the binding problem for consciousness

Simultaneity of consciousness with physical reality: the key that unlocks the mind-matter problem

Approaching the nature of consciousness through a phenomenal analysis of early vision. What is the explanandum?

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