Consciousness, context, and know-how

Abstract

In this paper I criticize the most significant recent examples of the practical knowledge analysis of knowledge-how in the philosophical literature: David Carr ]. I stress the importance of know-how in our contemporary understanding of the mind, and offer the beginnings of a treatment of know-how capable of providing insight into the use of know-how in contemporary cognitive science. Specifically, I claim that Carr's necessary conditions for know-how fail to capture the distinction he himself draws between ability and knowing-how. Moreover, Carr ties knowing-how to conscious intent, and to an explicit knowledge of procedural rules. I argue that both moves are mistakes, which together render Carr's theory an inadequate account both of common ascriptions of knowledge-how and of widely accepted ascriptions of knowledge-how within explanations in cognitive science. Finally, I note that Carr's conditions fail to capture intuitions (he shares) regarding the ascription of know-how to persons lacking ability.

Doing without believing: Intellectualism, knowledge-how, and belief-attribution

“…The relevance of no-belief cases to the knowledge-how debate was first noted (to the best of our knowledge) by Wallis (2008). Much as we do below, Wallis turned to empirical psychology in order to provide cases where agents appear to know how to ϕ while simultaneously failing to believe that any particular w is a way for them to ϕ .…”

“…2 Bengson et al (2009). 3 Stanley and Williamson (2001), Hawley (2003), Bengson and Moffett (2007), Wallis (2008) and Cath (2011). These cases are mostly hypothetical, but see Sect.…”

“…These cases are mostly hypothetical, but see Sect. 3 for discussion of an exception, Wallis (2008), who appeals to real-world cases. 4 We discuss what putative implicit beliefs are in Sect.…”

“…We do not speculate about what these sleepwalkers believe, or what they know how to do, but find these to be interesting questions for future research.13 Wallis (2008) claims that Stanley and Williamson "themselves acknowledge that…second-order beliefs about what I would call the epistemic status (or neutrally, the reliability of) complex sets of dispositions are not sufficient for knowledge-how(Stanley and Williamson 2001, p. 416). But, they do assert the necessity of such beliefs" (p. 139).…”

Nonfactual Know-How and the Boundaries of Semantics

“…⁴ strat⁴⁶y ⁸s to r⁴s⁸st t⁷⁴ v⁴ry ⁸d⁴a t⁷at lan⁶ua⁶⁴ s⁷ould b⁴ r⁴l⁴vant to t⁷⁴ natur⁴ o⁵ m⁴ntal stat⁴s. mp⁸r⁸cal work ⁸n co⁶n⁸t⁸v⁴ sc⁸⁴nc⁴ ⁷as v⁸nd⁸cat⁴d a d⁸st⁸nct⁸on t⁷at su⁶-⁶⁴st⁸v⁴ly r⁴s⁴mbl⁴s t⁷⁴ ⁵olk d⁸st⁸nct⁸on b⁴tw⁴⁴n know-⁷ow and propos⁸t⁸onal knowl⁴d⁶⁴ (s⁴⁴, amon⁶ many, Wall⁸s 2008, Adams 2009, and r⁴⁵⁴r⁴nc⁴s t⁷⁴r⁴⁸n). In t⁷⁴ ⁵ac⁴ o⁵ t⁷⁸s ⁴v⁸d⁴nc⁴, t⁷⁴ ar⁶um⁴nt ⁶o⁴s, all ar⁶um⁴nts bas⁴d on lan⁶ua⁶⁴ ar⁴ r⁴l⁸cs ⁵rom t⁷⁴ b⁴⁷av⁸or⁸sm-r⁸dd⁴n ⁴ra o⁵ ord⁸nary lan⁶ua⁶⁴ p⁷⁸losop⁷y.…”